Sanjurjada: Difference between revisions - Wikipedia

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{{Infobox military conflict

| conflict = ''Sanjurjada''

| image = ~~JoséSanjurjo~~Sanjurjada (10 de agosto de 1932).jpg

| image_size = ~~200px~~300px

| caption = [[José Sanjurjo]] in Seville, August 10, 1932

| date = 10–11 August 1932

| place = [[Madrid]], [[Seville]]

| result = Governmental victory

|combatant1= ~~{{flagicon|Spanish Republic}}~~ Government forces

|combatant2= ~~{{flagicon|Spain|1936}}~~ Rebel forces

| commander2 = ~~{{flagicon|Spain|1936}}~~ [[~~José~~:es:Emilio Barrera|Emilio ~~Sanjurjo~~Barrera]]

| commander1 = ~~{{flagicon|Spanish Republic}}~~ [[Manuel Azaña]]

| polstrength2 = Some monarchist and centre-republican politicians

| polstrength1 = Most centre-republican parties and some left-wing parties

|strength1=Most of the army

|strength2=Seville garrison, some 300 people in Madrid

|casualties3=Around 10 [[Killed in action|KIA]] and 20 [[Wounded in action|WIA]] (mostly rebels)

|}}

'''Sanjurjada''' ({{IPA-|es|saŋxuɾˈxaða|lang|}}) was a military coup staged in Spain on August 10, 1932. It was aimed at toppling the government but not necessarily at toppling the [[Second Spanish Republic|Republic]]. Following brief clashes it was easily suppressed in Madrid. Hardly any action was recorded elsewhere except [[Seville]], where local rebel commander general [[José Sanjurjo]] took control for some 24 hours but acknowledged defeat when faced with resolute governmental response. Due to his brief success and attention given during following trials, the entire coup ~~has been~~was later named after him.▼

▲'''Sanjurjada''' ({{IPA-es|saŋxuɾˈxaða|lang|}}) was a military coup staged in Spain on August 10, 1932. It was aimed at toppling the government but not necessarily at toppling the [[Second Spanish Republic|Republic]]. Following brief clashes it was easily suppressed in Madrid. Hardly any action was recorded elsewhere except [[Seville]], where local rebel commander general [[José Sanjurjo]] took control for some 24 hours but acknowledged defeat when faced with resolute governmental response. Due to his brief success and attention given during following trials, the entire coup has been later named after him.

==Background==

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 102-11543, Madrid, Ausrufung der Zweiten Spanischen Republik.jpg|thumb|left|[[Second Spanish Republic|Republic]] declared, 1931]]

The Spanish military greeted the advent of the Republic with little enthusiasm, though also with no particular hostility. The officer corps tended to be rather monarchist than republican and rather conservative than liberal, but following last years of the [[Miguel Primo de Rivera|dictatorship]], which had compromised and discredited the army, most military men preferred to stay clear of politics.<ref>Stanley G. Payne, ''Spain's First Democracy: The Second Republic, 1931–1936'', Madison 1993, {{ISBN|9780299136741}}, p. 96</ref> It was only when the new regime was set on a firmly leftward course and started to target the army for serious reform that voices of dissent started to be heard.<ref>Payne 1993, p. 96</ref> A [[Military reform of Manuel Azaña|series of reforms]], introduced since 1931 by the Prime Minister and the minister of war at the same time, [[Manuel Azaña]], was aimed at scaling down an overgrown officer corps, structural reform and bringing the armed forces firmly under the civilian control.<ref>Payne 1993, pp. 90-95</ref> This, combined with Azaña's patronising, if not contemptuous, rhetoric, proved fertile soil for growth of corporative disenchantment. The government confronted the dissent with few arrests, a number of personal reassignments and a handful of new regulations, which tightened its grip on the army further on.<ref>one of the regulations adopted in the spring of 1932 authorized the government to retire any general who remained for 6 months with no assignment; another empowered the cabinet to cancel the salary of military guilty of activity proscribed in Law on the Defense of the Republic; yet another ordered review of sentences decreed by the army court of honor prior to 1931, a move intended to counter supposed purges of left-wing officers, Payne 1993, p. 97</ref>

There is little indication that growing opposition among some of the generals was fuelled by ongoing political controversies, especially the problems of agrarian reform, relations between state and church, re-defining labor regulations and ambitions of peripheral nationalisms. It was rather politicians who attempted to bank on frustration of the military, some of them second-rank [[Alfonsism|Alfonsist]] monarchists, some of them [[Radical Party (Spain)|Republicans]] and some of them [[Carlists]]. A contemporary scholar distinguished between 3 different lobbying groups pursuing 3 paths: a "constitutional" revolt aimed at installing a new less radical regime, a coup leading to monarchist restoration and a technical "rectification" of the Republic, equidistant between the former two.<ref>Payne 1993, p. 97</ref> Another author suggests there were 2 strands, an Alfonsist one and a "constitutionalist" one,<ref>Nigel Townson, ''The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics Under the Second Republic, 1931–1936'', Brighton 2000, {{ISBN|9781898723950}}, p. 131</ref> though initially all that was rather secondary to generally corporative nature of the growing dissatisfaction.

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Since the late 1931 a number of officers have been discussing a possible coup. The talks, carried out in private and in public, until the early summer of 1932 were a loose sequence of meetings.<ref>Payne 1993, p. 98</ref> The conspirators holding highest positions were chief of staff [[Manuel Goded]]<ref>José Manuel Martínez Bande, ''Los años críticos: República, conspiración, revolución y alzamiento'', Madrid 2011, {{ISBN|9788499207469}}, p. 61</ref> and head of Carabineros, José Sanjurjo; others commanded field units or garrisons, like generals [[Emilio Fernández Pérez]],<ref>in the plan supposed to lead the insurgency in Madrid, Martínez Bande 2011, p. 61</ref> [[Miguel Ponte]],<ref>to lead in Valladolid, Martínez Bande 2011, p. 60</ref> [[:es:Manuel González Carrasco|Manuel González Carrasco]],<ref>to lead in Granada, Martínez Bande 2011, p. 60</ref> [[:es:José Fernández de Villa-Abrille|José Fernández de Villa-Abrille]],<ref>Townson 2000, p. 144</ref> [[:es:Rafael Villegas Montesinos|Rafael Villegas]]<ref>commander of the 1. infantry division, Antonio Atienza Peñarrocha, ''Africanistas y junteros: el ejercito español en Africa y el oficial José Enrique Varela Iglesias'' [PhD thesis Universidad Cardenal Herrera – CEU], Valencia 2012, p. 897</ref> and [[:es:José González Fernández de La Bandera|José González y Fernández]].<ref>mayor of seville, Townson 2000, p. 143</ref> The remaining plotters were retired generals [[:es:José Cavalcanti|José Cavalcanti]] and {{Interlanguage link|Emilio Barrera|es}},<ref>Martínez Bande 2011, p. 61</ref> some lower-rank officers,<ref>e.g. colonel Varela to lead in Cádfiz, see Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, pp. 897-899, colonel Ricardo Serrador to lead assault on ministry of war, Martínez Bande 2011, p. 60, or colonel Sanz de Lerín to lead the requetés in Pamplona, Martínez Bande 2011, p. 60</ref> a handful of second-rate politicians, chiefly [[:es:Manuel de Burgos y Mazo|Manuel Burgos y Mazo]],<ref>Payne 1993, p. 97</ref> and possibly few industrial tycoons.<ref>the first to be named is a tobacco tycoon Juan March; his direct involvement has never been proven, though it is considered almost certain, Townson 2000, pp. 141-2</ref> Stanley Payne estimates that only around 5% of the officer corps supported the coup.<ref>Browne, Harry. Spain's civil war. Routledge, 2014, p.15</ref>

A number of political heavyweights were at least aware of the conspiracy but assumed an ambiguous stand, the key ones having been [[Alejandro Lerroux]] and [[Melquíades Álvarez (politician)|Melquíades Alvares]].<ref>the position of Lerroux is one of the greatest question marks related to the coup. It seems he was prepared to accept leadership if offered to him by victorious rebels, but until that moment he preferred to stay clear of conspiracy so that he could claim no involvement in case of failure, Townson 2000, p. 141-2</ref> Some, also aware, have clearly refused to take part but took no action against the conspirators. The emerging centre-right leader [[José María Gil-Robles y Quiñones|José María Gil Robles]] rejected the scheme from the onset<ref>detailed discussion in Jesúa María Antelo Fraga, ''La incidencia del pronunciamiento de Sanjurjo sobre la formulación del accidentalismo político de Acción Popular'', [in:] ''Anales de Historia Contemporánea'' 1 (1982), pp. 243-268</ref> and the official Carlist executive withdrew from initial informal talks about [[requetés]] taking part,<ref>Martin Blinkhorn, ''Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931–1939'', Cambridge 2008, {{ISBN|9780521207294}}, pp. 88-9</ref> though some Carlists individually pledged support.<ref>the Carlist requeté instructor, Sanz de Lerín, took part in the final meeting of the conspirators on August 8. According to some sources he pledged 6,000 Navarrese requetes in support of the insurgency, but other scholars claim this is „a myth”, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 90</ref> The conspiracy climaxed in a meeting of August 8 in Madrid, when final decision to act was taken.<ref>in Palacio de conde de Moriles, Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, p. 901</ref>

Due to rather loose discipline among the conspirators their talks became sort of a public secret; the government was aware of the conspiracy also thanks to a well developed network of informers. ~~Manuel~~Prime Minister Azaña judged that the plotters lacked extensive backing and that instead of mounting a pre-emptive strike, he would be better off allowing the coup to unfold, effectively setting up a trap.<ref>Payne 1993, p. 97-8</ref> Apart from ensuring that loyal commanders were on alert and loyal units were stationed near key points, in late July he relieved a number of high-command officers, some of them conspiracy members, following the Carabanchel incident.<ref>Goded, when attending a ceremony at military school, concluded his address with „now there only remains for me to give a viva España, and nothing more”, which was widely perceived as an anti-republican snub. Following a brawl with pro-Republican colonel the latter was arrested and a scandal ensued. Goded received written support notes from a number of provincial commanding officers. It was exactly those officers that were later relieved from duty, Payne 1993, p. 98</ref> Goded resigned himself in act of solidarity, replaced by a new fully loyal chief of staff. On August 9 Azaña was already fully informed about the decision taken the previous day by the plotters; he forewarned generals in provincial capitals, e.g. in Zaragoza, Barcelona, and Cadiz,<ref>Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, p. 901</ref> and made sure loyal security units were located near the Ministry of War.<ref>Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, p. 902</ref>

==Rebel plan==

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==Coup in Madrid==

[[File:Cibeles desde el Ayuntamiento (Madrid) (14203354114).jpg|thumb|Cibeles, key battlefield of the coup. Ministry is the reddish building back-right]]

The conspirators were aware of the sketchy nature of their plan, but they feared that delay would lead to arrests and decimate the command structure; the moment of rebellion was set at 4 AM, August 10, 1932. During the night Barrera, Cavalcanti and Fernandez Perez placed themselves in one of the buildings next to the Ministry of War.<ref>Martínez Bande 2011, p. 62; according to some they were Barrera, Cavalcanti and general Coronel, Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, p. 902</ref> Despite the plan, no organized military sub-unit showed up in the very early morning hours in the neighborhood; instead, rather loose groups of some 100 officers and civilians<ref>probably many of them young Carlists, members of AET, Josep Miralles Climent, ''Estudiantes y obreros carlistas durante la dictadura franquista. La AET, el MOT y la FOS'', Madrid 2007, {{ISBN|9788495735331}}, p. 31. The two rebel civilians shot in Madrid on August 10, José María Triana and Justo San Miguel, were members of the Carlist academic organisation AET, Javier Ugarte Tellería, ''Fal Conde: Carlismo y modernismo'', [in:] ''Revista Universitaria de Historia Militar'' 7/13 (2018), p. 501</ref> attempted to enter the building using the back entrance at [[Paseo de Recoletos|calle de Prim]].<ref>Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, p. 902</ref> They were fired at by the sentries, suffered first losses and started to withdraw. Another, smaller group of equally disorganized rebels entered the nearby [[Cybele Palace|Palacio de Comunicaciones]] hoping to take command of Guardia Civil stationed there, but some were taken prisoner and the others withdrew.<ref>Martínez Bande 2011, p. 62</ref>

None of the infantry and cavalry regiments supposed to rise did. The only sub-unit which rose to arms was Depósito de Remonta; its company with some 70 soldiers commanded by colonel Martinez de Baños marched out from the barracks towards [[Paseo de la Castellana]], where they met insurgents withdrawing from earlier failed attempts; the group grew to some 300 men. At that time, colonel [[Juan Hernández Saravia|Juan Hernández]]<ref>jefe de gabinete militar, Martínez Bande 2011, p. 60-1</ref> and captain [[:es:Arturo Menéndez López|Arturo Menéndez]],<ref>director de Seguridad, Martínez Bande 2011, p. 60-1</ref> commanding from the ministry building, managed to deploy Guardia Civil and [[Guardia de Asalto]] units on defensive positions around [[Plaza de Cibeles]] before the rebels marched in. The shootout lasted around 30 minutes before loyalist units outflanked the rebels and started to advance from other neighboring streets.<ref>Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, p. 902</ref> At this point the rebels acknowledged defeat; some started to flee, some were wounded and most of them surrendered.<ref>Martínez Bande 2011, p. 62</ref> Azaña watched the events unfold from the upper floor of the ministry;<ref>Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, p. 902</ref> by 8 AM the coup in Madrid was over.

Undetected, Barrera, Cavalcanti and Fernandez Perez left their hideout. As was initially agreed in case of failure, Barrera took a prepared plane to Pamplona. Since the city remained calm<ref>during talks with the Carlist executive, lasting for few hours, Barrera again failed to convince the Carlists to move in, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 91</ref> he made it to [[Biarritz]] seeking a long-distance aircraft which would take him to Seville, but having failed he returned to Pamplona and flew back to Madrid, where he spent the night. Informed that Sanjurjo had been detained he dismissed the news as false and flew to Seville, due to lack of fuel landing on an improvised airfield. As his pilot managed to get petrol, on August 12 Barrera flew back to Madrid and, disguised, ~~by coaches and cars~~ made it to France by way of cars and buses.<ref>Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, p. 903</ref>

==Coup in the provinces==

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The only major urban centre in Spain where the coup triumphed was Seville. It was Sanjurjo appointed to lead the rebels in the city and back in July he established his operational network in the garrison.<ref>Payne 1993, pp. 98-9</ref> Having left Madrid in the afternoon of August 9, he arrived in Seville around 5 AM on August 10.<ref>Sanjurjo left Madrid in the afternoon of 9 August 4 PM in two cars, Leandro Alvarez Rey, ''La derecha en la II República: Sevilla, 1931–1936'', Sevilla 1993, {{ISBN|9788447201525}}, pp. 252-3</ref> Having set his provisional headquarters at a private estate,<ref>to deceive the authorities he booked accommodation in Hotel Cristina in Madrid. Upon arrival in Seville and having been met by pre-agreed conspirators, he settled at a chalet named Casablanca at Paseo de la Palmera, property of marquesa de Esquivel, Alvarez Rey 1993, p. 253</ref> he sent envoys to both civil governor and military commander, demanding compliance. There are conflicting accounts on their position: according to some they refused, according to the others they assumed an ambiguous stand.<ref>compare accounts of Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, p. 902, Martínez Bande 2011, pp. 61-62 or Alvarez Rey 1993, pp. 253-255</ref>

Faced with a possible stalemate, Sanjurjo decided to act. He showed up at Plaza de España, acclaimed by local Guardia Civil; his aide, [[:es:Miguel García de la Herrán|García de la Herrán]], did the same in the Zapateros barracks. From that moment most units in the city adhered to the coup;<ref>Martínez Bande 2011, p. 62, Alvarez Rey 1993, p. 255</ref> colonel [[Ildefonso Puigdendolas|~~Puigdengolas~~Puigdendolas]], the most determined of the loyalists, was disarmed before he could take action.<ref>Héctor Alonso García, ''El coronel Puigdengolas y la batalla de Badajoz: (agosto de 1936)'', Valencia 2014, {{ISBN|9788437095332}}, pp. 48-51</ref> With no opposition, Sanjurjo moved his command post to Capitania General building at Plaza de la Gavidia, declared state of war, gave press interviews, issued a manifesto and started appointing new civil and military authorities in the province. At 10 AM he was in full control, aware of the Madrid failure<ref>Alvarez Rey 1993, p. 256</ref> but unclear about other provincial capitals.<ref>Martínez Bande 2011, pp. 62-3</ref> He was also aware that the rebels seized control in [[Jerez de la Frontera]],<ref>Martínez Bande 2011, p. 62</ref> a city in the neighboring province of Cádiz; the local Guardia Civil commander [[:es:Pedro Romero Basart|Pedro Romero Basart]] was an oldtime Sanjurjo acquaintance.<ref>the rebels encountered no resistance and seized control in the early hours of August 10, but remained undecided as to future steps. When it became clear that the provincial capital Cadiz was firmly controlled by the loyalists, in Jerez the troops returned to the barracks. On mid-day August 10 the loyalists were back in command, and proceeded to detain these involved in the coup. Details in Joaquín Gil Honduvilla, ''Los sucesos de Jerez de la Frontera en la sublevación del 10 de agosto de 1932: el 28 tercio móvil de la Guardia Civil'', [in:] ''Revista española de historia militar'' 121 (2017), pp. 13-50</ref>

==Sanjurjo ruling==

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In the morning of August 10 he issued a manifesto, the only public statement of the rebels. It was edited by [[:es:Juan Pujol Martínez|Juan Pujol]]<ref>Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, p. 903</ref> and allegedly modeled on the manifesto prepared by the Republican rebels in the [[Jaca uprising]] in 1930.<ref>Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, pp. 905-6</ref> Grandiose and verbose in terms of style but enigmatic and vague in terms of contents, it lambasted the regime as based on social injustice and unlawful despotism, producing nothing but suffering and misery of the millions. In veiled language it made references to autonomous regulations as to assault on integrity of Spain, and to street violence as to chaos and the rule of criminals. Claiming responsibility for the country, the document pledged loyalty to the Republican system, but declared Cortes illegal from the very onset. It pledged to restore order, tranquility and social justice by means of discipline and the rule of law; it declared formation of a provisional governing Junta, which would hand over power to a new, legitimate parliament elected by the people. The document contained not a single reference either to monarchy or to religion.<ref>for the entire text, see alianzaeditorial service, available [http://www.alianzaeditorial.es/minisites/manual_web/3491170/CAPITULO2/DOCUMENTOS/6_ManifiestoSanjurjo.pdf here]</ref>

Sanjurjo dismissed both the civil governor and the military commander; he conducted talks with local established conservative politicians, either related to [[:es:Acción Popular (España)|Acción Popular]] or to defunct [[Patriotic Union (Spain)|Unión Patriótica]], some of them landholders, former diputación dignitaries and monarchists.<ref>Pedro Parias Gonzalez, Alvarez Rey 1993, p. 256</ref> However, he seemed to have most trust in the Carlists; [[Cristóbal González de Aguilar]] was nominated the new civil governor<ref>Alvarez Rey 1993, p. 256</ref> while others were appointed either to ayuntamiento<ref>José María García de Paredes was nominated secretario particular of the ayuntamiento, Alvarez Rey 1993, p. 256</ref> or to some military positions,<ref>e.g. Luis Redondo and José María Onrubia Anguiano, Alvarez Rey 1993, p. 256</ref> both in the city or in the controlled areas.<ref>[[Juan José Palomino Jiménez|José Palomino]] was nominated alcalde of Jerez de la Frontera, Alvarez Rey 1993, p. 256. Other Carlists involved included [[Manuel Fal Conde]] and his lieutenant, [[Enrique Barrau Salado]] </ref> No systematic repressive action was organized, though in the afternoon mounted police was sent to disperse the proletarian crowd, heading for the [[ayuntamiento]] and shouting "death to Sanjurjo!".<ref>Alvarez Rey 1993, p. 260</ref>

==Defeat==

Though the government lost control in Seville, Azaña and his staff were determined to regain it. Two regiments of infantry and further artillery units, all led by trusted commanders, were assembled in Madrid. In the early afternoon of August 10 they were loaded onto trains and departed towards the [[Andalusia]]n capital.<ref>Alvarez Rey 1993, pp. 229-260</ref> Further 2 battalions were concentrated in [[Ceuta]], 2 tabores of [[regulares]] were swiftly brought from Africa to Cadiz and an aviation bombing unit was relocated from [[Barcelona]] to [[Cartagena, Spain|Cartagena]]. Commanders of neighboring garrisons, Cádiz in particular, issued orders to prepare for combat.<ref>Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, p. 907</ref> In the evening first loyalist units started to deploy South of Seville and the city trade unions declared general strike.

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Compared to other instances of violent anti-government insurgency of the Second Republic<ref>the number of killed in other attempts was as follows: Asturias revolution (October 1934): 1,500, anarchist insurrection (December 1933): 90, anarchist insurrection (January 1933): 80, anarchist unrest in Barcelona and elsewhere (May 1931): 30, anarchist insurrection in Alto Llobregat (January 1932): 30. Stanley G. Payne, ''Political Violence during the Spanish Second Republic'', [in:] ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 25 (1990), p. 284, Pío Moa, ''Comienza la guerra civil. El PSOE y la Ezquerra emprenden la contienda'', Barcelona 2004, p. 38. The list did not include violence not related to open insurgency; the Seville general strike of July 1931 produced 10 casualties, the national farm strike in 1934 resulted in 13 dead, the anarchist bombing attempt against Seville-Barcelona train (January 1934) killed 20 and street violence between February and July 1936 caused some 270 deaths</ref> the coup did not produce massive bloodshed, first because the government monitored the plot and contained insurgency before it could unfold, but also because Sanjurjo, the only rebel commanding significant troops, stepped back when faced with the perspective of a civil war. The total number of fatal casualties is usually given as around 10, all of them result of the Madrid clashes: some sources claim 2 officers and 7 soldiers,<ref>Ruiz Manjón-Cabeza 1986, p. 23, also Townson 2000, p. 130</ref> others count in also 2 rebel civilians.<ref>Payne 1993, p. 99</ref> An unclear number of wounded, probably around 20–30, was recorded.<ref>Ruiz Manjón-Cabeza 1986, p. 23</ref> As no artillery was used, there were no major damages.

Key conspirators captured were trialed: Esteban-Infantes was sentenced to 12 years in prison, Garcia de Herrán to lifetime incarceration and Sanjurjo received death penalty, soon commuted to life imprisonment. Since the Republican legal system did not allow trials in ~~absentio~~absentia, leaders who fled Spain, including Barrera, were effectively barred from re-entering the country and condemned to exile.<ref>Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, p. 904</ref> Some 200 officers were brought to trial; ultimately 144 of them, plus some civilians, were deported to the [[Spanish ~~African~~Sahara]]n military prison outpost in [[Dakhla, Western Sahara|Villa Cisneros]], few released as late as the fall of 1933.<ref>Payne 1993, p. 100</ref> Around 300 officers considered accomplices not involved were stripped of command.

382 families deemed involved in the coup were expropriated; since almost all were landholders, their former estates became subject to agrarian reform.<ref>Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, p. 905</ref> Taking advantage of administrative measures available under the Republican law, provincial civil governors detained some 5,000 people for few days or at most few weeks.<ref>Martínez Bande 2011, p. 65</ref> The government took advantage of the coup to crack down on most centers of perceived anti-Republican activity, either involved in the conspiracy or not: some 130 newspapers were closed, usually temporarily,<ref>Payne 1993, p. 100, Martínez Bande 2011, p. 65</ref> and most premises belonging to parties and organizations deemed involved were shut down.<ref>Martínez Bande 2011, p. 65</ref>

Azaña made sure that [[Cuerpo de Seguridad y Asalto|Guardia de Asalto]] was a reliable and loyal republican guard; the formation was further expanded to 10,000.<ref>Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, p. 905</ref> On the other hand, it was decided to decrease the powers of Minister of War and split control over other armed uniformed branches: [[Carabineros]], formation serving mostly as border guards and uninvolved in the coup, but since February 1932 headed by Sanjurjo, were moved to the Ministry of Finance and similarly, Guardia Civil were transferred to the Ministry of Interior.<ref>Payne 1993, p. 136</ref>

==Long-term impact==

[[File:General Cabanellas with the bust of General Jose Sanjurjo.jpg|thumb|left|Unveiling the bust of Sanjurjo (~~Burgos~~[[Pamplona]], 1936)]]

Though the coup failed, its outcome significantly contributed to the future sequence of events. Perhaps its most important result was further radicalization of the Left;<ref>José Luis Comellas García-Llera, ''Historia de España contemporánea'', Madrid 2014, {{ISBN|9788432143465}}, p. 429; on the Right, Sanjurjada rather reinforced the constitutionalists, see e.g. Julián Sanz Hoya, ''De la resistencia a la reacción: las derechas frente a la Segunda República (Cantabria, 1931–1936)'', Santander 2006, {{ISBN|9788481024203}}, p. 93</ref> ensured that reaction would never come to terms with the Republican regime, their propaganda embraced increasingly sectarian tone and spurred belligerency of the party militias.<ref>Antelo Fraga 1982, pp. 243-268</ref> Amnesty to those involved in Sanjurjada became key program of the Right during the 1933 elections, leading to further, bi-polar division of political scene.<ref>José Gonzalo Sancho Flórez, ''La Segunda República Española'', Madrid 1997, {{ISBN|9788446001645}}, p. 61</ref>

Azaña rested in his disdainful confidence that the military were pathetic failures, which would lead to his complacency and self-assurance in the [[Spanish coup of July 1936|spring of 1936]].<ref>Martínez Bande 2011, p. 64</ref> The rebellion seriously weakened Lerroux, commencing disintegration of the [[Radical Party (Spain)|Radical Party]]. Future conspirators concluded that any action should not rely on retired or off-duty generals but must be organized by officers holding key command positions, as indeed would be the case 4 years later.<ref>Atienza Peñarrocha 2012, p. 905</ref> As the coup was about military rebels having been defeated by military loyalists, would-be future plotters overfocused on the army; they disregarded potential for popular resistance, which in 1936 would prove decisive in opposing the insurgents. For Gil-Robles Sanjurjada demonstrated utter nonsense of violent means and reinforced penchant for constitutional path, pursued later by [[CEDA]].<ref>Antelo Fraga 1982, pp. 243-268</ref> Own successful decisiveness when repelling the rebels might have given Arturo Menéndez excessive confidence during the [[Casas Viejas incident]] half a year later. Last but not least, the events elevated Sanjurjo to symbolic champion of later conspiracy, resulting in his appointment to nominal leader of the 1936 coup.<ref>see e.g. Stanley G. Payne, ''The Spanish Civil War'', Cambridge 2012, {{ISBN|9780521174701}}, pp. 64, 67</ref>

There are conflicting views on long-term impact of the coup on stability of the Republic. Some authors maintain that it strengthened the regime and helped to consolidate the forces supporting it.<ref>Luis E. Íñigo Fernández, ''Breve historia de la Segunda República española'', Madrid 2010, {{ISBN|9788497639668}}, p. 195</ref> Others claim that the coup and Azaña's strategy to let it develop weakened the Republic by rocking the already unstable boat of Spanish politics.<ref>Payne 1993, p. 101, Victor Manuel Arbeloa, ''El quiebro del PSOE (1933–1934): Del gobierno a la revolución'', Madrid 2015, {{ISBN|9788415705666}}, p. 306, Townson 2000, p. 145, Sancho Flórez 1997, p. 61</ref> It was the first major attempt against the Republican constitutional order – thought not against the Republic itself<ref>earlier works noted allegedly "evidently monarchist hue of the uprising", Townson 2000, p. 133, but latest works claim this is clearly not correct, see Comellas García-Llera 2014, p. 429</ref> - and soon it would prove the point of reference for the Right and for the Left, both sides plotting their own subversive schemes.<ref>see e.g. comparisons between the Sanjurjo coup of 1932 and the Asturian revolution of 1934 in Moa 2006</ref> There are students who compare Sanjurjada to 19th-century Spanish pronunciamientos: military-driven, politically ambiguous, [[Praetorianism|praetorian]] in concept, with restoring order as key rationale and no popular mobilisation involved.<ref>Payne 1993, p. 99</ref> Others consider it rather preconfiguration of the 1936 coup if not the [[Spanish Civil War|Civil War]] itself. In Marxist historiography the coup is presented as a counter-revolutionary attempt financed by oligarchy of landowners,<ref>compare Dolores Ibárruri, Manuel Azcárate, Luis Balaguer, Antonio Cordón, Irene Falcón, José Sandoval (eds.), ''Historia del Partido Comunista de España'', Paris 1960, see especially the chapter ''Frente al peligro fascista''</ref> though also in many other scholarly works Sanjurjada is lined-up in a history of right-wing violence, increasingly flavored with authoritarian trends.<ref>see e.g. Gabriel Cardona Escanero, ''El golpe de Sanjurjo, anticipo del 18 de julio'', [in:] ''La Aventura de la historia'' 106 (2007), pp. 30-39, Paul Preston, ''El holocausto español: Odio y exterminio en la Guerra Civil y después'', Madrid 2011, {{ISBN|9788499920498}}, Sheelagh M. Ellwood, ''Spanish Fascism in the Franco Era: Falange Española de las Jons, 1936–76'', London 1987, {{ISBN|9781349086887}}, p. 12</ref> There are scholars who consider Sanjurjo's action a stepping stone from [[Accidentalism and catastrophism|accidentalism]] to ~~Fascism~~[[fascism]].<ref>Fernando del Rey Reguillo, Manuel Álvarez Tardío, ''The Spanish Second Republic Revisited: From Democratic Hopes to the Civil War (1931–1936)'', Brighton 2012, {{ISBN|9781845194598}}, p. 236</ref>

==See also==

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* Cristóbal García García, ''Huelva, al final de la huida de Sanjurjo. Verano de 1932'', [in:] ''Huelva en su historia'' 8 (2001), pp. 279–304

* Joaquín Gil Honduvilla, ''19 de agosto de 1932: el general Sanjurjo en Sevilla'', [in:] ''Revista española de historia militar'' 113 (2009), pp. 173–184

* Pablo Gil Vico, ''Nuevas aportaciones sobre los procesos incoados con motivo del golpe de 10 de agosto de 1932'', [in:] ''Revista de ~~estudios~~Estudios ~~políticos~~Políticos'' 145 (2009), pp. 159–183

* Jacobo López Barja de Quiroga, ''La sublevación del General Sanjurjo'', [in:] Carlos Lesmes Serrano (ed.), ''Los procesos célebres seguidos ante el Tribunal Supremo en sus doscientos años de historia: siglos XIX y XX'', vol. 2, Madrid 2014, {{ISBN|9788434021099}}, pp. 159–250

* José Manuel Martínez Bande, ''Los años críticos: República, conspiración, revolución y alzamiento'', Madrid 2011, {{ISBN|9788499207469}}

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[[Category:1932 in Spain]]

[[Category:Conflicts in 1932]]

[[Category:Attempted coups in Spain]]