Mind

The generalization of ''mind'' to include all mental faculties, thought, [[Volition (psychology)|volition]], feeling and memory, gradually develops over the 14th and 15th centuries.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=mind|title=Online Etymology Dictionary|website=www.etymonline.com|access-date=2017-01-02|archive-date=2017-10-04|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171004154809/http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=mind|url-status=live}}</ref>

The generalization of ''mind'' to include all mental faculties, thought, [[Volition (psychology)|volition]], feeling and memory, gradually develops over the 14th and 15th centuries.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=mind|title=Online Etymology Dictionary|website=www.etymonline.com|access-date=2017-01-02|archive-date=2017-10-04|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171004154809/http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=mind|url-status=live}}</ref>

== Definitions ==

== Definition ==

The mind is the totality of psychological phenomena and capacities, encompassing [[consciousness]], [[thought]], [[perception]], [[Sensation (psychology)|sensation]], [[feeling]], [[Mood (psychology)|mood]], [[motivation]], [[behavior]], [[memory]], and [[learning]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kim|2011|p=2, 6}} | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018i}} | {{harvnb|HarperCollins|2022a}} | {{harvnb|Morton|2005|p=603}} }}</ref> The term is sometimes used in a more narrow sense to refer only to higher or more abstract cognitive functions associated with [[Logical reasoning|reasoning]] and [[awareness]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018i}} | {{harvnb|Paivio|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FaGYAgAAQBAJ&pg=PR6 vi–vii]}} }}</ref> Minds were traditionally conceived as immaterial substances or independent entities and contrasted with [[matter]] and [[Physical object|body]]. In the contemporary discourse, they are more commonly seen as features of other entities and are often understood as capacities of material brains.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kim|2011|pp=2–3, 5–6}} | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=5–8, 68–69}} | {{harvnb|McQueen|McQueen|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ho5KEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA135 135]}} | {{harvnb|Morton|2005|p=603}} }}</ref> The precise definition of mind is disputed and while it is generally accepted that some non-human animals also have mind, there is no agreement on where exactly the boundary lies.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sharov|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oQ5HAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA343 343–344]}} | {{harvnb|Carruthers|2019|pp=ix, 29–30}} | {{harvnb|Griffin|1998|pp=53–55}} }}</ref> Despite these disputes, there is wide agreement that mind plays a central role in most aspects of human life as the seat of consciousness, emotions, thoughts, and sense of personal identity.<ref>{{harvnb|Stich|Warfield|2008|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=NEGK_ZStddkC&pg=PR9 ix–x]}}</ref> Various fields of inquiry study the mind; the main ones include [[psychology]], [[cognitive science]], [[neuroscience]], and [[philosophy]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pashler|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=lu3aMe6kRowC&pg=PR29 xxix–xxx]}} | {{harvnb|Friedenberg|Silverman|Spivey|2022|pp=14–17}} }}</ref>

The mind is often understood as a faculty that manifests itself in [[mental state|mental phenomena]] like sensation, perception, thinking, reasoning, memory, belief, desire, emotion and motivation.<ref name="BritannicaMind">{{cite web |title=Mind |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/mind |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=31 May 2021 |language=en |archive-date=9 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210509202531/https://www.britannica.com/topic/mind |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Kim2006">{{cite book |last1=Kim |first1=Jaegwon |title=Philosophy of Mind |date=2006 |publisher=Boulder: Westview Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KIMPOM-3 |chapter=1. Introduction |edition=2nd |access-date=2021-06-01 |archive-date=2021-06-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602214643/https://philpapers.org/rec/KIMPOM-3 |url-status=live }}</ref> Mind or mentality is usually contrasted with body, matter or physicality. Central to this contrast is the [[intuition]] that minds exhibit various features not found in and maybe even incompatible with the material universe as described by the [[natural sciences]].<ref name="Pernu"/><ref name="Kim2006"/> On the traditionally dominant substantialist view associated with [[René Descartes]], minds are defined as independent thinking substances. But it is more common in contemporary philosophy to conceive minds not as [[Substance theory|substances]] but as [[Property (philosophy)|properties]] or capacities possessed by humans and higher animals.<ref name="Kim2006"/><ref name="HonderichMind">{{cite book |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=Mind |access-date=2021-06-01 |archive-date=2021-01-29 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210129082636/https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The words ''[[Psyche (psychology)|psyche]]'' and ''mentality'' are usually used as synonyms of ''mind''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018j}} | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018i}} | {{harvnb|Merriam-Webster|2024}} | {{harvnb|Kim|2011|p=7}} }}</ref> They are often employed in overlapping ways with the terms ''[[soul]]'', ''spirit'', ''[[cognition]]'', ''[[intellect]]'', ''[[intelligence]]'', and ''[[brain]]'' but their meanings are not exactly the same. Some religions understand the soul as an independent entity that constitutes the immaterial essence of human beings, is of divine origin, survives bodily death, and is [[Immortality|immortal]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|HarperCollins|2022b}} | {{harvnb|Kim|2011|pp=5, 31}} | {{harvnb|Swinburne|1998|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> The word ''spirit'' has various additional meanings not directly associated with mind, such as [[Spirit (animating force)|a vital principle animating living beings]] or a [[Spirit (supernatural entity)|supernatural being]] inhabiting objects or places.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|HarperCollins|2022c}} | {{harvnb|Merriam-Webster|2024a}} }}</ref> Cognition encompasses certain types of mental processes in which [[knowledge]] is acquired and [[information]] processed.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|HarperCollins|2022d}} | {{harvnb|Bermúdez|2014|p=16}} }}</ref> The intellect is one mental capacity responsible for thought, reasoning, and understanding<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|HarperCollins|2022e}} | {{harvnb|Merriam-Webster|2024b}} }}</ref> and is closely related to intelligence as the ability to acquire, understand, and apply knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bernstein|Nash|2006|pp=273–274}} | {{harvnb|Nairne|2011|p=312}} | {{harvnb|Merriam-Webster|2024c}} }}</ref> The brain is the physical organ responsible for most or all mental functions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018i}} | {{harvnb|Uttal|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=WSbxDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT98 96–97]}} | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|p=4}} }}</ref>

Despite this agreement, there is still a lot of difference of opinion concerning what the exact nature of mind is and various competing characterizations have been proposed, sometimes referred to as ''theories of mind''.<ref name="BritannicaMind"/>{{sfn|Armstrong|2002|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=87uIAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA5 5–6]}}{{efn|not to be confused with the related term ''[[theory of mind]]''}} Philosophical definitions of mind usually proceed not just by listing various types of phenomena belonging to the mind but by searching the "mark of the mental": a feature that is shared by all mental states and only by mental states.<ref name="Pernu">{{cite journal |last1=Pernu |first1=Tuomas K. |title=The Five Marks of the Mental |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=2017 |volume=8 |page=1084 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01084 |pmid=28736537 |language=English |issn=1664-1078|pmc=5500963 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Kim2006"/> ''Epistemic approaches'' define mental states in terms of the privileged epistemic access the subject has to these states. This is often combined with a ''consciousness-based approach'', which emphasizes the primacy of consciousness in relation to mind. ''Intentionality-based approaches'', on the other hand, see the power of minds to refer to objects and represent the [[World#Philosophy of mind|world]] as being a certain way as the ''mark of the mental''. According to ''behaviorism'', whether an entity has a mind only depends on how it behaves in response to external stimuli while ''functionalism'' defines mental states in terms of the causal roles they play. The differences between these diverse approaches are substantial since they result in very different answers to questions like whether animals or computers have minds.<ref name="BritannicaMind"/><ref name="Pernu"/><ref name="Kim2006"/>

There is a great variety of mental states. They fall into categories like sensory and non-sensory or conscious and unconscious.<ref name="HonderichProblems"/><ref name="Kim2006"/> Various of the definitions listed above excel for states from one category but struggle to account for why states from another category are also part of the mind. This has led some theorists to doubt that there is a ''mark of the mental''. So maybe the term "mind" just refers to a cluster of loosely related ideas that do not share one unifying feature.<ref name="Kim2006"/><ref name="Pernu"/><ref name="HonderichMind"/> Some theorists have responded to this by narrowing their definitions of mind to "higher" intellectual faculties, like thinking, reasoning and memory. Others try to be as inclusive as possible regarding "lower" intellectual faculties, like sensing and emotion.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Başar |first1=Erol |title=Brain–Body–Mind in the Nebulous Cartesian System: A Holistic Approach by Oscillations |date=2010 |publisher=Springer Science & Business Media |isbn=978-1-4419-6136-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NAbMHo-ux58C |language=en |chapter=1.1 Introduction |access-date=2015-04-18 |archive-date=2021-06-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602234452/https://books.google.com/books?id=NAbMHo-ux58C |url-status=live }}</ref>

In popular usage, ''mind'' is frequently synonymous with ''thought'': the private conversation with ourselves that we carry on "inside our heads".<ref>{{cite book|last1=Israel|first1=Richard|last2=North|first2=Vanda|title=Mind Chi Re-wire Your Brain in 8 Minutes a Day; Strategies for Success in Business and Life|date=2010|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|location=Chichester|isbn=978-1907321375|page=12|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VCP63CWtVqIC&q=mind+is+frequently+synonymous+with+thought:&pg=PA12|access-date=18 April 2015|archive-date=21 April 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220421115327/https://books.google.com/books?id=VCP63CWtVqIC&q=mind+is+frequently+synonymous+with+thought:&pg=PA12|url-status=live}}</ref> Thus we "make up our minds", "change our minds" or are "of two minds" about something. One of the key attributes of the mind in this sense is that it is a private sphere to which no one but the owner has access. No one else can "know our mind". They can only interpret what we consciously or unconsciously communicate.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Masters|first1=Frances|title=Harness your Amazingly Creative Mind|url=http://www.thefusionmodel.com/harness-amazingly-creative-mind/|website=www.thefusionmodel.com|access-date=18 April 2015|date=2014-08-29|archive-date=2015-04-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150420035909/http://www.thefusionmodel.com/harness-amazingly-creative-mind/|url-status=live}}</ref>

=== Epistemic and consciousness-based approaches ===

''[[Epistemic]] approaches'' emphasize that the subject has privileged access to all or at least some of their mental states.<ref name="Kim2006"/><ref name="HonderichProblems">{{cite book |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=mind, problems of the philosophy of |access-date=2021-06-01 |archive-date=2021-01-29 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210129082636/https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="BritannicaPhilosophy">{{cite web |title=Philosophy of mind |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=31 May 2021 |language=en |archive-date=9 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210609021814/https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind |url-status=live }}</ref> It is sometimes claimed that this access is ''direct'', ''private'' and ''infallible''. ''Direct access'' refers to non-inferential knowledge. When someone is in pain, for example, they know directly that they are in pain, they do not need to infer it from other indicators like a body part being swollen or their tendency to scream when it is touched.<ref name="Kim2006"/> But we arguably also have non-inferential knowledge of external objects, like trees or cats, through perception, which is why this criterion by itself is not sufficient. Another epistemic privilege often mentioned is that mental states are ''private'' in contrast to ''public'' external facts.<ref name="Kim2006"/><ref name="BritannicaPhilosophy"/> For example, the fallen tree lying on a person's leg is directly open to perception by the bystanders while the victim's pain is private: only they know it directly while the bystanders have to infer it from their screams. It was traditionally often claimed that we have infallible knowledge of our own mental states, i.e. that we cannot be wrong about them when we have them.<ref name="Kim2006"/> So when someone has an itching sensation, for example, they cannot be wrong about having this sensation. They can only be wrong about the non-mental causes, e.g. whether it is the consequence of bug bites or of a fungal infection. But various counterexamples have been presented to claims of infallibility, which is why this criterion is usually not accepted in contemporary philosophy. One problem for all ''epistemic approaches'' to the ''mark of the mental'' is that they focus mainly on [[conscious]] states but exclude [[Unconscious mind|unconscious]] states. A [[Repression (psychology)|repressed]] [[desire]], for example, is a mental state to which the subject lacks the forms of privileged epistemic access mentioned.<ref name="Kim2006"/><ref name="HonderichMind"/>

One way to respond to this worry is to ascribe a privileged status to conscious mental states. On such a ''consciousness-based approach'', conscious mental states are non-derivative constituents of the mind while unconscious states somehow depend on their conscious counterparts for their existence.<ref name="Pernu"/><ref name="BritannicaPhilosophy"/><ref name="Bourget">{{cite web |last1=Bourget |first1=David |last2=Mendelovici |first2=Angela |title=Phenomenal Intentionality |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenal-intentionality/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=31 May 2021 |date=2019 |archive-date=1 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210501025145/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenal-intentionality/ |url-status=live }}</ref> An influential example of this position is due to [[John Searle]], who holds that unconscious mental states have to be accessible to consciousness to count as "mental" at all.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Searle |first1=John R. |title=Consciousness, Unconsciousness and Intentionality |journal=Philosophical Issues |date=1991 |volume=1 |pages=45–66 |doi=10.2307/1522923 |jstor=1522923 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1522923 |issn=1533-6077 |access-date=2021-06-01 |archive-date=2021-06-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602220858/https://www.jstor.org/stable/1522923 |url-status=live }}</ref> They can be understood as dispositions to bring about conscious states.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Smith |first1=David Livingstone |title=Freud's Philosophy of the Unconscious |date=1999 |publisher=Springer Netherlands |isbn=978-94-017-1611-6 |pages=137–150 |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-017-1611-6_14 |language=en |chapter=John Searle: The Dispositional Unconscious |series=Studies in Cognitive Systems |volume=23 |doi=10.1007/978-94-017-1611-6_14 |access-date=2021-06-01 |archive-date=2021-06-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602215143/https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-017-1611-6_14 |url-status=live }}</ref> This position denies that the so-called "deep unconscious", i.e. mental contents inaccessible to consciousness, exists.<ref name="Gillett">{{cite journal |last1=Gillett |first1=Eric |title=Searle and the "Deep Unconscious" |journal=Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology |date=1996 |volume=3 |issue=3 |pages=191–200 |doi=10.1353/ppp.1996.0027 |s2cid=145408333 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GILSAT |access-date=2021-06-01 |archive-date=2021-06-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602214309/https://philpapers.org/rec/GILSAT |url-status=live }}</ref> Another problem for ''consciousness-based approaches'', besides the issue of accounting for the unconscious mind, is to elucidate the nature of consciousness itself. Consciousness-based approaches are usually interested in ''[[Consciousness#Types of consciousness|phenomenal consciousness]]'', i.e. in qualitative experience, rather than ''[[Consciousness#Types of consciousness|access consciousness]]'', which refers to information being available for reasoning and guiding behavior.<ref name="Pernu"/><ref name="Overgaard2018">{{cite journal |last1=Overgaard |first1=Morten |title=Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access |journal=Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences |date=2018-09-19 |volume=373 |issue=1755 |pages=20170353 |doi=10.1098/rstb.2017.0353 |pmid=30061466 |pmc=6074085 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Naccache |first1=Lionel |title=Why and how access consciousness can account for phenomenal consciousness |journal=Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences |date=2018-09-19 |volume=373 |issue=1755 |pages=20170357 |doi=10.1098/rstb.2017.0357 |pmid=30061470 |pmc=6074081 }}</ref> Conscious mental states are normally characterized as qualitative and subjective, i.e. that there is something it is like for a subject to be in these states. Opponents of consciousness-based approaches often point out that despite these attempts, it is still very unclear what the term "phenomenal consciousness" is supposed to mean.<ref name="Pernu"/> This is important because not much would be gained theoretically by defining one ill-understood term in terms of another. Another objection to this type of approach is to deny that the conscious mind has a privileged status in relation to the unconscious mind, for example, by insisting that the deep unconscious exists.<ref name="Bourget"/><ref name="Gillett"/>

=== Intentionality-based approaches ===

''Intentionality-based approaches'' see [[intentionality]] as the ''mark of the mental''.<ref name="Kim2006"/><ref name="Pernu"/><ref name="HonderichProblems"/> The originator of this approach is [[Franz Brentano]], who defined intentionality as the characteristic of mental states to refer to or be about objects.<ref name="Franz Brentano: 3.2 Intentionality">{{cite web |last1=Huemer |first1=Wolfgang |title=Franz Brentano: 3.2 Intentionality |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/brentano/#intentionality |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=28 May 2021 |date=2019 |archive-date=6 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210506072124/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/brentano/#intentionality |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Crane1998">{{cite journal |last1=Crane |first1=Tim |title=Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental |journal=Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement |date=1998 |volume=43 |pages=229–251 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CRAIAT |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/S1358246100004380 |s2cid=54073879 |access-date=2021-06-01 |archive-date=2021-06-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602213640/https://philpapers.org/rec/CRAIAT |url-status=live }}</ref> One central idea for this approach is that minds represent the world around them, which is not the case for regular physical objects.<ref name="HonderichProblems"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Heil |first1=John |title=Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction |edition=2nd |date=2004 |publisher=New York: Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HEIPOM-2 |chapter=Introduction |access-date=2021-06-01 |archive-date=2021-06-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602213940/https://philpapers.org/rec/HEIPOM-2 |url-status=live }}</ref> So a person who believes that there is ice cream in the fridge represents the world as being a certain way. The ice cream can be represented but it does not itself represent the world. This is why a mind is ascribed to the person but not to the ice cream, according to the intentional approach.<ref name="Kim2006"/> One advantage of it in comparison to the ''epistemic approach'' is that it has no problems to account for unconscious mental states: they can be intentional just like conscious mental states and thereby qualify as constituents of the mind.<ref name="Siewert">{{cite web |last1=Siewert |first1=Charles |title=Consciousness and Intentionality |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-intentionality/index.html |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=31 May 2021 |date=2017 |archive-date=2 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602214121/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-intentionality/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> But a problem for this approach is that there are also some non-mental entities that have intentionality, like maps or linguistic expressions.<ref name="Kim2006"/><ref name="Jacob">{{cite web |last1=Jacob |first1=Pierre |title=Intentionality |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=31 May 2021 |date=2019 |archive-date=29 August 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180829135343/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/ |url-status=live }}</ref> One response to this problem is to hold that the intentionality of non-mental entities is somehow derivative in relation to the intentionality of mental entities. For example, a map of Addis Ababa may be said to represent Addis Ababa not intrinsically but only extrinsically because people ''interpret'' it as a representation.<ref name="Siewert"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Haugeland |first1=John |title=The Intentionality All-Stars |journal=Philosophical Perspectives |date=1990 |volume=4 |pages=383–427 |doi=10.2307/2214199 |jstor=2214199 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2214199 |issn=1520-8583 |access-date=2021-06-01 |archive-date=2021-06-03 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210603024941/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2214199 |url-status=live }}</ref> Another difficulty is that not all mental states seem to be intentional. So while [[beliefs]] and [[desires]] are forms of representation, this seems not to be the case for pains and itches, which may ''indicate'' a problem without ''representing'' it.<ref name="Crane1998"/><ref name="Jacob"/> But some theorists have argued that even these apparent counterexamples should be considered intentional when properly understood.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Bain |first1=David |title=Intentionalism and Pain |journal=Philosophical Quarterly |date=2003 |volume=53 |issue=213 |pages=502–523 |doi=10.1111/1467-9213.00328 |url=https://philpapers.org/archive/BAIIAP-4.pdf |access-date=2021-06-01 |archive-date=2021-06-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602215923/https://philpapers.org/archive/BAIIAP-4.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gozzano |first1=Simone |title=Locating and Representing Pain |journal=Philosophical Investigations |date=2019 |volume=42 |issue=4 |pages=313–332 |doi=10.1111/phin.12238 |s2cid=171463821 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GOZLAR |access-date=2021-06-01 |archive-date=2021-06-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602213845/https://philpapers.org/rec/GOZLAR |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Behaviorism and functionalism ===

''[[Behaviorism|Behaviorist]]'' definitions characterize mental states as dispositions to engage in certain publicly observable behavior as a reaction to particular external stimuli.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lazzeri |first1=Filipe |title=O que é Behaviorismo sobre a mente? |journal=Principia |date=2019-08-16 |volume=23 |issue=2 |pages=249–277 |doi=10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p249 |s2cid=212888121 |url=https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n2p249 |language=pt |issn=1808-1711 |access-date=2021-06-01 |archive-date=2021-06-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602213639/https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n2p249 |url-status=live |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Graham">{{cite web |last1=Graham |first1=George |title=Behaviorism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=31 May 2021 |date=2019 |archive-date=9 July 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180709040248/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/ |url-status=live }}</ref> On this view, to ascribe a belief to someone is to describe the tendency of this person to behave in certain ways. Such an ascription does not involve any claims about the internal states of this person, it only talks about behavioral tendencies.<ref name="Graham"/> A strong motivation for such a position comes from empiricist considerations stressing the importance of observation and the lack thereof in the case of private internal mental states. This is sometimes combined with the thesis that we could not even learn how to use mental terms without reference to the behavior associated with them.<ref name="Graham"/> One problem for behaviorism is that the same entity often behaves differently despite being in the same situation as before. This suggests that explanation needs to make reference to the internal states of the entity that mediate the link between stimulus and response.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Mele |first1=Alfred R. |title=Motivation and Agency |date=2003 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MELMAA-2 |chapter=Introduction |access-date=2021-06-01 |archive-date=2021-06-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210614221359/https://philpapers.org/rec/MELMAA-2 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mele |first1=Alfred R. |title=Motivation: Essentially Motivation-Constituting Attitudes |journal=Philosophical Review |date=1995 |volume=104 |issue=3 |pages=387–423 |doi=10.2307/2185634 |jstor=2185634 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MELMEM |access-date=2021-06-01 |archive-date=2021-05-15 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210515023352/https://philpapers.org/rec/MELMEM |url-status=live }}</ref> This problem is avoided by [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|functionalist]] approaches, which define mental states through their causal roles but allow both external and internal events in their causal network.<ref name="Polger">{{cite web |last1=Polger |first1=Thomas W. |title=Functionalism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/functism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=31 May 2021 |archive-date=19 May 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190519120233/https://www.iep.utm.edu/functism/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Gulick |first1=Robert Van |editor1-first=Ansgar |editor1-last=Beckermann |editor2-first=Brian P |editor2-last=McLaughlin |editor3-first=Sven |editor3-last=Walter |title=Functionalism |url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199262618-e-8 |website=The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind |language=en |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001 |date=2009 |isbn=978-0-19-926261-8 |access-date=2021-06-01 |archive-date=2021-06-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602215414/https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199262618-e-8 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="HonderichMind"/> On this view, the definition of pain-state may include aspects such as being in a state that "tends to be caused by bodily injury, to produce the belief that something is wrong with the body and ... to cause wincing or moaning".<ref name="Levin">{{cite web |last1=Levin |first1=Janet |title=Functionalism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=31 May 2021 |date=2018 |archive-date=18 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210418140903/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="HonderichProblems"/>

One important aspect of both behaviorist and functionalist approaches is that, according to them, the mind is ''[[Multiple realizability|multiply realizable]]''.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Bickle |first1=John |title=Multiple Realizability |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=31 May 2021 |date=2020 |archive-date=16 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210316094454/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/ |url-status=live }}</ref> This means that it does not depend on the exact constitution of an entity for whether it has a mind or not. Instead, only its behavioral dispositions or its role in the causal network matter.<ref name="Polger"/><ref name="Levin"/> The entity in question may be a human, an animal, a silicon-based alien or a robot. Functionalists sometimes draw an analogy to the software-hardware distinction where the mind is likened to a certain type of software that can be installed on different forms of hardware. Closely linked to this analogy is the thesis of [[computationalism]], which defines the mind as an information processing system that is physically implemented by the neural activity of the brain.<ref name="Pernu"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Rescorla |first1=Michael |title=The Computational Theory of Mind |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=31 May 2021 |date=2020 |archive-date=18 December 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201218211337/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

One problem for all of these views is that they seem to be unable to account for the phenomenal consciousness of the mind emphasized by ''consciousness-based approaches''.<ref name="HonderichProblems"/> It may be true that pains are caused by bodily injuries and themselves produce certain beliefs and moaning behavior. But the causal profile of pain remains silent on the intrinsic unpleasantness of the painful experience itself. Some states that are not painful to the subject at all may even fit these characterizations.<ref name="HonderichProblems"/><ref name="Levin"/>

===Externalism===

{{Main articles|Externalism}}

Theories under the umbrella of externalism emphasize the mind's dependency on the environment. According to this view, mental states and their contents are at least partially by external circumstances.{{sfn|Rowlands|Lau|Deutsch|2020|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Introduction}}{{sfn|Smith|loc=Lead Section}} For example, some forms of content externalism hold that it can depend on external circumstances whether a belief refers to one object or another.{{sfn|Rowlands|Lau|Deutsch|2020|loc=§ 1. Introduction, § 3. Content Externalism}}{{sfn|Smith|loc=§ 1. Hilary Putnam and Natural Kind Externalism}} The [[extended mind thesis]] states that external circumstances not only affect the mind but are part of it.{{sfn|Rowlands|Lau|Deutsch|2020|loc=§ 1. Introduction, § 5. Extended Mind}}{{sfn|Greif|2017|pp=4311–4312}} The closely related view of [[enactivism]] holds that mental processes involve an interaction between organism and environment.{{sfn|Rowlands|Lau|Deutsch|2020|loc=§ 7. Extended Mind and the 4E Mind}}{{sfn|Rowlands|2009|pp=53–56}}

== Forms ==

== Forms ==

Another contrast is between [[Disposition|dispositional]] and occurrent mental states. A dispositional state is a power that is not exercised. If a person believes that cats have whiskers but does not think about this fact, it is a dispositional belief. By activating the belief to consciously think about it or use it in other cognitive processes, it becomes occurrent until it is no longer actively considered or used. The great majority of a person's beliefs are dispositional most of the time.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bartlett|2018|pp=1, 4–5 }} | {{harvnb|Schwitzgebel|2024|loc=§ 2.1 Occurrent Versus Dispositional Belief}} | {{harvnb|Wilkes|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jtArBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA412 412]}} }}</ref>

Another contrast is between [[Disposition|dispositional]] and occurrent mental states. A dispositional state is a power that is not exercised. If a person believes that cats have whiskers but does not think about this fact, it is a dispositional belief. By activating the belief to consciously think about it or use it in other cognitive processes, it becomes occurrent until it is no longer actively considered or used. The great majority of a person's beliefs are dispositional most of the time.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bartlett|2018|pp=1, 4–5 }} | {{harvnb|Schwitzgebel|2024|loc=§ 2.1 Occurrent Versus Dispositional Belief}} | {{harvnb|Wilkes|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jtArBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA412 412]}} }}</ref>

== Theories of the nature of mind ==

Theories of the nature of mind aim to determine what all [[mental state]]s have in common. They seek to discover the "mark of the mental", that is, the criteria that distinguish mental from non-mental phenomena.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Olson|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=T7W7BAAAQBAJ&pg=PT111 111–112]}} | {{harvnb|Kim|2011|pp=17–18}} | {{harvnb|O’Madagain|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Bayne|2022|pp=8–9}} }}</ref> Epistemic criteria say that the unique feature of mental states is how people know about them. For example, if a person has a toothache, they have direct or non-inferential knowledge that they are in pain. But they do not have this kind of knowledge of the physical causes of the pain and may have to consult [[empirical evidence|external evidence]] through visual inspection or a visit to the dentist. Another feature commonly ascribed to mental states is that they are private, meaning that others do not have this kind of direct access to a person's mental state and have to infer it from other observations, like the pain behavior of the person with the toothache. Some philosophers claim that knowledge of some or all mental states is [[infallible]], for instance, that a person cannot be mistaken about whether they are in pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kim|2011|pp=18–20}} | {{harvnb|Bayne|2022|pp=8–10}} | {{harvnb|Audi|1993|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pfLzbG5VjscC&pg=PA167 167–168]}} }}</ref>

A related view states that all mental states are either conscious or accessible to consciousness. According to this view, when a person actively remembers the fact that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris then this state is mental because it is part of consciousness; when the person does not think about it, this belief is still a mental state because the person could bring it to consciousness by thinking about it. This view denies the existence of a "deep unconsciousness", that is, unconscious mental states that cannot in principle become conscious.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kriegel|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ICf-AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA384 384]}} | {{harvnb|Searle|1991|pp=45–47, 50}} | {{harvnb|Gillett|1996|pp=191–192}} }}</ref>

A historically influential theory says that [[intentionality]]{{efn|Intentionality is to be [[Intention#Intention and intentionality|distinguished from intention]] in the sense of having a plan to perform a certain action.<ref>{{harvnb|Jacob|2023|loc=§ 1. Why is intentionality so-called?}}</ref>}} is the mark of the mental. A state is intentional if it refers to or represents something. For example, if a person perceives a piano or thinks about it then the mental state is intentional because it refers to a piano. This view distinguishes between original and derivative intentionality. Mental states have original intentionality while some non-mental phenomena have derivative intentionality. For instance, the word ''piano'' and a picture of a piano are intentional in a derivative sense: they do not directly refer to a piano but if a person looks at them, they may evoke in this person a mental state that refers to a piano. It is controversial whether all mental states are intentional; possible exceptions include itches, tickles, and pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|O’Madagain|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Kriegel|2015|pp=141}} | {{harvnb|Kim|2011|pp=23–25}} | {{harvnb|Kriegel|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ICf-AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA383 383–384]}} | {{harvnb|Crane|1998|pp=229–230}} }}</ref>

According to [[behaviorism]], mental states are dispositions to engage in certain publicly observable behavior as a reaction to particular external stimuli. This view implies that mental phenomena are not private internal states but are accessible to empirical observation like regular physical phenomena.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Levin|2023|loc=§ 2.3 Behaviorism}} | {{harvnb|Graham|2023|loc=§ 1. What is Behaviorism?, § 5. Why be a Behaviorist}} | {{harvnb|Cunningham|2000|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ubdiw-ALgo0C&pg=PA40 40]}} }}</ref> [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|Functionalism]] agrees that mental states do not depend on the exact internal constitution of the mind and characterizes them instead in regard to their functional role. Unlike behaviorism, this role is not limited to behavioral patterns but includes other factors as well. For example, part of the functional role of [[pain]] is given by its relation to bodily injury and its tendency to cause behavioral patterns like moaning and other mental states, like a desire to stop the pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Levin|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 1. What is Functionalism?}} | {{harvnb|Polger|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Cunningham|2000|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ubdiw-ALgo0C&pg=PA40 40]}} }}</ref> [[Computationalism]], a similar theory prominent in cognitive science, defines minds in terms of cognitions and [[computation]]s as information processors.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rescorla|2020|loc=Lead Section, § 3. The classical computational theory of mind}} | {{harvnb|Friedenberg|Silverman|Spivey|2022|p=2–3}} | {{harvnb|Bermúdez|2014|pp=3, 85}} }}</ref>

Theories under the umbrella of [[externalism]] emphasize the mind's dependency on the environment. According to this view, mental states and their contents are at least partially by external circumstances.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rowlands|Lau|Deutsch|2020|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Introduction}} | {{harvnb|Smith|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> For example, some forms of content externalism hold that it can depend on external circumstances whether a belief refers to one object or another.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rowlands|Lau|Deutsch|2020|loc=§ 1. Introduction, § 3. Content Externalism}} | {{harvnb|Smith|loc=§ 1. Hilary Putnam and Natural Kind Externalism}} }}</ref> The [[extended mind thesis]] states that external circumstances not only affect the mind but are part of it, like a diary or a calculator extend the mind's capacity to store and process information.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rowlands|Lau|Deutsch|2020|loc=§ 1. Introduction, § 5. Extended Mind}} | {{harvnb|Greif|2017|pp=4311–4312}} | {{harvnb|Kiverstein|Farina|Clark|2013}} }}</ref> The closely related view of [[enactivism]] holds that mental processes involve an interaction between organism and environment.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rowlands|Lau|Deutsch|2020|loc=§ 7. Extended Mind and the 4E Mind}} | {{harvnb|Rowlands|2009|pp=53–56}} }}</ref>

== Relation to matter ==

== Relation to matter ==

The mind–body problem is the difficulty of providing a general explanation of the relationship between mind and body, for example, of the link between thoughts and brain processes. Despite their different characteristics, mind and body interact with each other, like when a bodily change causes mental discomfort or when a limb moves because of an [[intention]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kim|2005|p=608}} | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=11–12}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|pp=3–4}} }}</ref> According to [[substance dualism]], minds or [[soul]]s exist as distinct [[Substance theory|substances]] that have mental states while material things are another type of substance. This view implies that, at least in principle, minds can exist without bodies.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=34–36}} | {{harvnb|Kim|2005|p=608}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|pp=13, 41–42}} }}</ref> [[Property dualism]] is another form of [[Mind–body dualism|dualism]] that says that mind and matter are not distinct individuals but different [[Property (philosophy)|properties]] that apply to the same individual.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=5, 202–203}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|p=44}} }}</ref> [[Monism|Monist]] views, by contrast, state that reality is made up of only one kind. According to [[Idealism|idealists]], everything is mental.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=5}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|pp=44, 47–48}} }}</ref> They understand material things as mental constructs, for example, as ideas or perceptions.<ref>{{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|p=246}}</ref> According to [[Neutral monism|neutral monists]], the world is at its most fundamental level neither physical nor mental but neutral. They see physical and mental concepts as convenient but superficial ways to describe reality.<ref>{{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|p=256}}</ref>

The mind–body problem is the difficulty of providing a general explanation of the relationship between mind and body, for example, of the link between thoughts and brain processes. Despite their different characteristics, mind and body interact with each other, like when a bodily change causes mental discomfort or when a limb moves because of an [[intention]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kim|2005|p=608}} | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=11–12}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|pp=3–4}} }}</ref> According to [[substance dualism]], minds or [[soul]]s exist as distinct [[Substance theory|substances]] that have mental states while material things are another type of substance. This view implies that, at least in principle, minds can exist without bodies.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=34–36}} | {{harvnb|Kim|2005|p=608}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|pp=13, 41–42}} }}</ref> [[Property dualism]] is another form of [[Mind–body dualism|dualism]] that says that mind and matter are not distinct individuals but different [[Property (philosophy)|properties]] that apply to the same individual.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=5, 202–203}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|p=44}} }}</ref> [[Monism|Monist]] views, by contrast, state that reality is made up of only one kind. According to [[Idealism|idealists]], everything is mental.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=5}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|pp=44, 47–48}} }}</ref> They understand material things as mental constructs, for example, as ideas or perceptions.<ref>{{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|p=246}}</ref> According to [[Neutral monism|neutral monists]], the world is at its most fundamental level neither physical nor mental but neutral. They see physical and mental concepts as convenient but superficial ways to describe reality.<ref>{{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|p=256}}</ref>

The monist view most influential in contemporary philosophy is [[physicalism]], also referred to as [[materialism]],{{efn|The two terms are usually treated as synonyms but some theorists distinguish them by holding that materialism is restricted to [[matter]] while physicalism is a wider term that includes additional physical phenomena, like [[force]]s.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Marcum|2008|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1arGI9NZcAkC&pg=PA19 19]}} | {{harvnb|Stoljar|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=iqGLAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}} }}</ref>}} which states that everything is physical.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|p=68}} | {{harvnb|Stoljar|2024|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|p=48}} }}</ref> According to [[Eliminative materialism|eliminative physicalism]], there are no mental phenomena, meaning that things like beliefs and desires do not form part of reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=71–72}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|pp=75–76}} }}</ref> [[Reductive physicalism|Reductive physicalists]] defend a less radical position: they say that mental states exist but can, at least in principle, be completely described by physics without the need for special sciences like psychology. For example, [[Behaviorism|behaviorists]] aim to analyze mental concepts in terms of observable behavior without resorting to internal mental states.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=72–73, 102–104}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|p=148}} }}</ref> [[Type identity theory]] also belongs to reductive physicalism and says that mental states are the same as brain states.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ravenscroft|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=f1EAEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA47 47]}} | {{harvnb|Stoljar|2024|loc=§ 2.2.1 Type Physicalism}} }}</ref> While [[Non-reductive physicalism|non-reductive physicalists]] agree that everything is physical, they say that mental concepts describe physical reality on a more abstract level that cannot be achieved by physics.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=129–130}} | {{harvnb|Bigaj|Wüthrich|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1bW9CwAAQBAJ&pg=PA357 357]}} }}</ref> According to [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|functionalism]], mental concepts do not describe the internal constitution of physical substances but functional roles within a system.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Levin|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|p=62}} }}</ref> For example, part of the functional role of [[pain]] is given by its relation to bodily injury and its tendency to cause behavioral patterns like moaning and other mental states, like the desire to stop the pain.<ref>{{harvnb|Levin|2023|loc=§ 1. What is Functionalism?}}</ref> One consequence of this view is that mind does not depend on brains but can also be [[Multiple realizability|realized by other systems]] that implement the corresponding functional roles, possibly also computers.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Levin|2023|loc=§ 1. What is Functionalism?}} | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=136–137}} }}</ref>

The monist view most influential in contemporary philosophy is [[physicalism]], also referred to as [[materialism]],{{efn|The two terms are usually treated as synonyms but some theorists distinguish them by holding that materialism is restricted to [[matter]] while physicalism is a wider term that includes additional physical phenomena, like [[force]]s.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Marcum|2008|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1arGI9NZcAkC&pg=PA19 19]}} | {{harvnb|Stoljar|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=iqGLAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}} }}</ref>}} which states that everything is physical.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|p=68}} | {{harvnb|Stoljar|2024|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|p=48}} }}</ref> According to [[Eliminative materialism|eliminative physicalism]], there are no mental phenomena, meaning that things like beliefs and desires do not form part of reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=71–72}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|pp=75–76}} }}</ref> [[Reductive physicalism|Reductive physicalists]] defend a less radical position: they say that mental states exist but can, at least in principle, be completely described by physics without the need for special sciences like psychology. For example, [[Behaviorism|behaviorists]] aim to analyze mental concepts in terms of observable behavior without resorting to internal mental states.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=72–73, 102–104}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|p=148}} }}</ref> [[Type identity theory]] also belongs to reductive physicalism and says that mental states are the same as brain states.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ravenscroft|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=f1EAEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA47 47]}} | {{harvnb|Stoljar|2024|loc=§ 2.2.1 Type Physicalism}} }}</ref> While [[Non-reductive physicalism|non-reductive physicalists]] agree that everything is physical, they say that mental concepts describe physical reality on a more abstract level that cannot be achieved by physics.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=129–130}} | {{harvnb|Bigaj|Wüthrich|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1bW9CwAAQBAJ&pg=PA357 357]}} }}</ref> According to [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|functionalism]], mental concepts do not describe the internal constitution of physical substances but functional roles within a system.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Levin|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|p=62}} }}</ref> One consequence of this view is that mind does not depend on brains but can also be [[Multiple realizability|realized by other systems]] that implement the corresponding functional roles, possibly also computers.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Levin|2023|loc=§ 1. What is Functionalism?}} | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=136–137}} }}</ref>

The [[hard problem of consciousness]] is a central aspect of the mind–body problem: it is the challenge of explaining how physical states can give rise to conscious experience. Its main difficulty lies in the [[Subjectivity and objectivity (philosophy)|subjective]] and qualitative nature of consciousness, which is unlike typical physical processes. The hard problem of consciousness contrasts with the "easy problems" of explaining how certain aspects of consciousness function, such as perception, memory, or learning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weisberg|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Stating the Problem}} | {{harvnb|Blackmore|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=WycuAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA33 33–35]}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|pp=39–40}} }}</ref>

The [[hard problem of consciousness]] is a central aspect of the mind–body problem: it is the challenge of explaining how physical states can give rise to conscious experience. Its main difficulty lies in the [[Subjectivity and objectivity (philosophy)|subjective]] and qualitative nature of consciousness, which is unlike typical physical processes. The hard problem of consciousness contrasts with the "easy problems" of explaining how certain aspects of consciousness function, such as perception, memory, or learning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weisberg|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Stating the Problem}} | {{harvnb|Blackmore|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=WycuAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA33 33–35]}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|pp=39–40}} }}</ref>

* {{cite web |author1=American Psychological Association |title=Brain |url=https://dictionary.apa.org/brain|website=APA Dictionary of Psychology |language=en |date=2018f |publisher=American Psychological Association }}

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