Battle of the Pusan Perimeter: Difference between revisions - Wikipedia

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=== Eastern corridor ===

The terrain along the ROK front on the eastern corridor made movement extremely difficult. A major road ran from Daegu {{convert|50|mi}} east, to P'ohang-dong on Korea's east coast.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=319}} The only major ~~north-south~~north–south road intersecting this line moved south from Andong through [[Yongch'on]], midway between Daegu and P'ohang-dong. The only other natural entry through the line was at the town of [[An'gang-ni]], {{convert|12|mi}} west of P'ohang-dong, situated near a valley through the natural rugged terrain to the major rail hub of Kyongju, which was a staging post for moving supplies to Daegu.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=319}} Walker chose not to heavily reinforce the area as he felt the terrain made meaningful attack impossible, preferring to respond to attack with reinforcements from the transportation routes and air cover from [[Pohang Airport|Yongil Airfield]], which was south of P'ohang-dong.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=320}}

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=== Daegu ===

Shortly before the Busan Perimeter battles began, Walker established Daegu as the Eighth Army's headquarters.{{sfn|Fehrenbach|2001|p=135}} Right at the center of the Busan Perimeter, Daegu stood at the entrance to the Naktong River valley, an area where KPA forces could advance in large numbers in close support. The natural barriers provided by the Naktong River to the south and the mountainous terrain to the north converged around Daegu, which was also the major transportation hub and last major South Korean city aside from Busan itself to remain in UN hands.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=335}} From south to north, the city was defended by the US 1st Cavalry Division, and the ROK 1st and 6th ~~Divisions~~divisions of ROK II Corps. 1st Cavalry Division was spread out along a long line along the Naktong River to the south, with its [[5th Cavalry Regiment|5th]] and [[8th Cavalry Regiment|8th cavalry regiment]]s holding a line {{convert|24|km}} along the river and the [[7th Cavalry Regiment]] in reserve along with artillery forces, ready to reinforce anywhere a crossing could be attempted.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=337}}

==== Daegu advance ====

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South of Waegwan, two more KPA divisions stood ready to cross the Naktong River in a coordinated attack with the divisions to the north.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=339}} The experienced KPA 3rd Division was concentrated in the vicinity of [[Songju]], while the untested KPA 10th Division was concentrated in the [[Goryeong County|Koryong]] area.{{sfn|Alexander|2003|p=141}} These two divisions crossed in the US 1st Cavalry Division's line. The KPA 3rd Division's 7th Regiment started crossing the Naktong on August 9. Despite being spotted and taking fire, the bulk of it reached the east bank safely and moved inland into the hills.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=339}} The 5th Cavalry Regiment and its supporting artillery, now fully alerted, spotted the other two regiments and forced them back to the west bank.{{sfn|Alexander|2003|p=141}} Only a small number of KPA reached the east side where either they were captured, or hid until recrossing the river the following night.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=339}}

At dawn on August 9, 1st Cavalry Division learned of the North Korean crossing.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=340}} KPA infantry had gathered on Hill 268, also known as Triangulation Hill, which was {{convert|3|mi}} southeast of Waegwan and {{convert|10|mi}} northwest of Taegu.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=341}} The hill was important for its proximity to lines of communication, as the main Korean ~~north-south~~north–south highway and the main double-track Seoul-Pusan railroad skirted its base.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=340}} 1st Cavalry Division counterattacked the KPA gathering to force them back across the river, but their initial assault was repelled. The next morning, August 10, air strikes and artillery barrages rocked Hill 268, devastating the KPA, who withdrew back behind the river.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=341}}

==== Yongp'o ====

The KPA plan for the attack against Taegu from the west and southwest demanded the KPA 3rd and 10th ~~Divisions~~divisions make a coordinated attack. {{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=342}} Elements of the 10th Division began crossing the Naktong early on August 12, in the vicinity of Tuksong-dong, on the Koryong-Taegu road, but were driven back.{{sfn|Alexander|2003|p=142}} A more determined KPA crossing began early in the morning on August 14.{{sfn|Alexander|2003|p=142}} This attack also stalled and was driven back to the river.{{sfn|Leckie|1996|p=113}} By nightfall, the [[bridgehead]] at Yongp'o was eliminated.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=344}}

==== Carpet bombing ====

[[File:Waegwan Bombing.jpg|thumb|250px|alt=Bombs explode over a large area of land|US Air Force post-strike picture of a {{convert|3.5|by|7.5|mi|km|adj=on}} area near Waegwan, in which 99 bombers dropped 3,500 ~~500lb~~500 lb bombs]]

In the mountains northeast of Waegwan, the ROK 1st Division continued to suffer from KPA attacks throughout mid-August. KPA pressure against the division never ceased for long. US planners believed the main KPA attack would come from the west, and so it massed its forces to the west of Taegu. It mistakenly believed up to 40,000 KPA troops were near Taegu. This number was above the actual troop numbers for the KPA, which had only 70,000 men along the entire perimeter.{{sfn|Alexander|2003|p=142}}

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Fed by intelligence from the [[Soviet Union]], the North Koreans were aware the UN forces were building up along the Pusan Perimeter and that they had to conduct an offensive soon or else forfeit the battle.{{sfn|Fehrenbach|2001|p=139}} In planning its new offensive, the KPA commanders decided that any attempt to flank the UN force was impossible thanks to the support of UN naval forces.{{sfn|Catchpole|2001|p=31}} Instead, they opted to use frontal attacks to breach the perimeter and collapse it.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=393}} A secondary objective was to surround Taegu and destroy the UN units in that city. As part of this mission, the KPA would first cut the supply lines to Taegu.{{sfn|Millett|2000|p=506}}

North Korean planners enlarged their force in anticipation of a new offensive.{{sfn|Catchpole|2001|p=32}} The KPA, originally numbering 10 divisions in two corps, was enlarged to 14 divisions with several independent brigades.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=394}} The new troops were brought in from reserve forces based in North Korea.{{sfn|Millett|2000|p=507}} [[Marshal]] [[Choe Yong-gon (army commander)|Choe Yong Gun]] served as deputy commander of the KPA, with General [[Kim Chaek]] in charge of the Front Headquarters.{{sfn|Fehrenbach|2001|p=139}} Beneath them were the II Corps in the east and I Corps in the west. II Corps controlled the KPA 10th, 2nd, 4th, 9th, 7th, and 6th ~~Divisions~~divisions as well as the 105th Armored Division, with the [[16th Armored Brigade]] and [[104th Security Brigade]] in support. I Corps commanded the 3rd, 13th, 1st, 8th, 15th, 12th, and 5th ~~Divisions~~divisions with the 17th Armored Brigade in support.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=394}} This force numbered approximately 97,850 men, although a third of it comprised raw recruits or forced conscripts from South Korea, and lacked weapons and equipment.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=395}}{{sfn|Millett|2000|p=508}} By August 31 they were facing a UN force of 120,000 combat troops plus 60,000 support troops.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=181}}

On August 20, the KPA commands distributed operations orders to their subordinate units.{{sfn|Fehrenbach|2001|p=139}} These orders called for a simultaneous five-prong attack against the UN lines. This would overwhelm the UN defenders and allow the KPA to break through the lines in at least one place to push the UN forces back. Five battle groupings were ordered as follows:{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=395}}

# 6th and 7th ~~Divisions~~divisions to break through the US 25th Infantry Division at Masan.

# 9th, 4th, 2nd, and 10th ~~Divisions~~divisions to break through the US 2nd Infantry Division at the Naktong Bulge to Miryang and Yongsan.

# 3rd, 13th, and 1st ~~Divisions~~divisions to break through the US 1st Cavalry Division and ROK 1st Division to Taegu.

# 8th and 15th ~~Divisions~~divisions to break through the ROKA 8th Division and ROKA 6th Division to [[Hayang]] and Yongch'on.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=396}}

# 12th and 5th ~~Divisions~~divisions to break through the ROKA Capital Division and ROKA 3rd Division to P'ohang-dong and Kyongju.

On August 22, North Korean ~~Premier~~premier [[Kim Il Sung]] ordered the war to be over by September 1, but the scale of the offensive did not allow for this.{{sfn|Millett|2000|p=507}} Groups 1 and 2 were to begin their attack at 23:30 on August 31 and ~~Groups~~groups 3, 4, and 5 would begin their attacks at 18:00 on September 2.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=396}} The attacks were to closely connect in order to overwhelm UN troops at each point simultaneously, forcing breakthroughs in multiple places that the UN would be unable to reinforce.{{sfn|Fehrenbach|2001|p=139}}{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=181}} The KPA also relied primarily on night attacks to counter the UN's major advantages in air superiority and naval firepower. KPA generals thought such night attacks would prevent UN forces from firing effectively and result in large numbers of UN [[friendly fire]] casualties.{{sfn|Alexander|2003|p=182}}

The attacks caught UN planners and troops by surprise.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=180}} By August 26, the UN troops believed they had destroyed the last serious threats to the perimeter, and anticipated the war ending by late November.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=397}} ROK units, in the meantime, suffered from low morale thanks to their failures to defend effectively thus far in the conflict.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=398}} UN troops were looking ahead to [[Operation Chromite]], their [[amphibious assault]] far behind North Korean lines at the port of Inchon on September 15, and did not anticipate the KPA would mount a serious offensive before then.{{sfn|Alexander|2003|p=180}}

The Great Naktong Offensive was one of the most brutal fights of the Korean War.{{sfn|Varhola|2000|p=7}} The five-prong offensive led to heavy fighting around [[Battle of Haman|Haman]], [[Battle of Kyongju|Kyongju]], [[Second Battle of Naktong Bulge|Naktong Bulge]], [[Battle of Nam River|Nam River]], [[Battle of Yongsan|Yongsan]], [[Battle of Tabu-Dong|Tabu-Dong]] and [[Battle of Ka-san|Ka-san]].{{sfn|Millett|2000|p=557}}{{sfn|Bowers|Hammong|MacGarrigle|2005|p=162}} The KPA attacks made appreciable gains and forced the UN troops along the Pusan Perimeter to form a thin line of defense, relying on mobile reserves for the strength to push back KPA attackers. From September 1{{spaced ndash}}8 this fighting was intense and the battle was a very costly deadlock for the two overextended armies.{{sfn|Catchpole|2001|p=36}} The KPA were initially successful in breaking through UN lines in multiple places and made substantial gains in surrounding and pushing back UN units.{{sfn|Fehrenbach|2001|p=139}} On September 4–5 the situation was so dire for the UN troops that the Eighth Army and ROK moved their headquarters elements from Taegu to Pusan to prevent them from being overrun, though Walker remained in Taegu with a small forward detachment. They also prepared their logistics systems for a retreat to a smaller defensive perimeter called the ''"Davidson Line''". By September 6, however, Walker decided another retreat would not be necessary.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=416}}

On September 15, exhausted KPA troops were caught unaware by the [[Battle of Inchon|landings at Inchon]], far behind their lines. Those forces that remained after 15 days of fighting were forced to retreat in a total rout or risk being completely cut off.{{sfn|Bowers|Hammong|MacGarrigle|2005|p=176}} Isolated KPA resistance continued until September 18, but on that date UN troops were mounting a full-scale [[Pusan Perimeter offensive|breakout offensive]] and [[UN September 1950 counteroffensive|pursuing retreating KPA units]] to the north, ending the fighting around the Pusan Perimeter.{{sfn|Bowers|Hammong|MacGarrigle|2005|p=175}}

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Two [[war correspondent]]s were killed in the campaign, [[Ian Morrison (journalist)|Ian Morrison]], a reporter for ''[[The Times]]'', and [[Christopher Buckley (journalist)|Christopher Buckley]], a reporter for ''[[The Daily Telegraph]]'', were killed August 13 near Waegwan when their vehicle struck a landmine. One [[India]]n [[Indian Armed Forces|Armed Forces]] officer was also killed in the incident, Colonel [[Manakampat Kesavan Unni Nayar]], a representative from the [[UNCOK|United Nations Commission on Korea]].{{sfn|''The Times'', August 14, 1950}}

North Korean casualties for the battle are almost impossible to ~~estimate~~reasonably ~~precisely~~estimate due to a lack of records. It is difficult to determine how many South Korean citizens were forcibly conscripted during the battle and how many deserted as opposed to being killed. Larger engagements destroyed entire regiments and even divisions of KPA troops, and their strength had to be estimated based on accounts of KPA captured by the UN. On September 1, the KPA numbered approximately 97,850 in South Korea, and up to one third of this number is suspected to have been conscripts from South Korea.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=395}} In the aftermath of the Busan Perimeter battle, only 25,000 or 30,000 of these soldiers returned to North Korea by the end of the month. Upwards of one third of the attacking force became casualties in the fighting. This would mean KPA casualties from September 1 to 15 could range from roughly 41,000 to 36,000 killed and captured, with an unknown number of wounded.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=604}} With the addition of the 5,690 killed in the Bowling Alley, 3,500 at the Naktong Bulge,{{sfn|Fehrenbach|2001|p=134}} at least 3,700 at Daegu{{sfn|Alexander|2003|p=142}}{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=345}}{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=347}} and an unknown number at P'ohang-dong before September 1, KPA casualties likely topped 50,000 to 60,000 by the end of the battle. They also lost 239 T-34 tanks and 74 SU-76 self-propelled guns; virtually all of the armor they possessed.{{sfn|Appleman|1998|p=602}}

=== War crimes ===