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Line 15: The Little Russian political ideology emerged simultaneous to the revival of the [[Byzantine Empire|Byzantine]] term [[Little Rus']] at the end of the 16th century in the literary works of the [[Russian Orthodox Church|Christian Orthodox]] clergy of the [[Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth]]. Numerous prominent Orthodox authors and hierarchs, such as [[Ivan Vyshenskyi]], [[Zakharia Kopystenskyi]], [[Yelisey Pletenetskyi]] or [[Job Boretsky]] strongly opposed the [[Union of Brest]] and polemicized with [[Roman Catholics]] and [[Uniates]], developing the ideas of a pan-Russian Orthodox people. The Little Russian idea steadily gained support among [[Zaporozhian Cossacks|Cossack leadership]]<ref name="Plokhy2011"/> and Orthodox brotherhoods, which were subject to judicial, economic and religious discrimination; and repeatedly organized violent uprisings against Polish rule from the end of the 16th to the first half of the 17th century. Simultaneously, the image of an Orthodox Tsar who would protect the All-Russian people against the injustice of the Poles became a political tool used by Moscovite rulers.<ref name="Дмитриев">Дмитриев М. В. Этнонациональные отношения русских и украинцев в свете новейших исследований // Вопросы истории, № 8. 2002. — С. 154—159</ref> Later, the existence of such sentiments facilitated the signing of the [[Treaty of Pereyaslav]] during the [[Khmelnytsky Uprising]] as well as the political integration of the Hetmanate into the [[Tsardom of Russia]].{{Original research inline|date=January 2014}} After the Pereyaslav Treaty the Hetmanate faced a civil war known as [[The Ruin (Ukrainian history)|The Ruin]] between pro-Russian and pro-Polish forces. After the pro-Polish fraction lost [[Left-Bank Ukraine]], the Little Russian identity ultimately consolidated after already being strongly enrooted in ecclesiastic circles.<ref name="Дмитриев"/> An important milestone was the 1674 publication of the [[Kievan Synopsis]] by the archimandrite of the [[Kiev Pechersk Lavra]] and the rector of the [[Kievan Theological School]] [[Innocent Gizel]]. In his work he described the dynastic succession between Kiev and [[Moscow]] as well as the existence of a [[ Under the influence of the Kiev-born archbishop of the [[Russian Orthodox Church]] [[Theophan Prokopovich]] the [[Russian Empire]] gradually became the object of primary identification of Little Russians while {{clarify span|text=Little Russia was considered as the local homeland<ref name="KMM"/><ref>Plokhy S. The Two Russias of Teofan Prokopovych. P. 349, 359</ref> which composes the Empire on the equal basis with former[[Muscovy]].<ref>Когут З. Питання російсько-української єдности та української окремішности в українській думці і культурі ранньомодерного часу // Коріння ідентичности. Студії ранньомодерної та модерної історії України. — К.: «Критика», 2004. — С.133-168.</ref>||date=January 2014}} The Cossack elite under Russian rule looked for ways to legitimize its social status in the hierarchy of the Russian Empire to benefit from the perspective of attractive career possibilities.<ref>Кононенко, Василий. Элита Войска Запорожского — Гетманщины между проектами Малороссии и Российской империи (конец 20-х — начало 60-х гг. XVIII в.) Актуальні проблеми вітчизняної та всесвітньої історії, 2010. С. 127—134</ref> Supporters of the Little Russian identity considered the Russian Empire as their own state which they built together with (Great) [[Russians]]. In the 18th century many Little Russians held important political positions of the Empire: Chancellor [[Alexander Bezborodko]], minister of education [[Pyotr Zavadovsky]], general prosecutor [[Dmitry Troshchinsky]], Field Marshal and President of the Academy of Science [[Kyrylo Rozumovskyi]], Field Marshal [[Alexey Razumovsky]] among others.<ref name="Kohut">Когут З. Українська еліта у XVIII столітті та її інтеґрація в російське дворянство // Коріння ідентичности. Студії ранньомодерної та модерної історії України. — К.: «Критика», 2004. — С.46-79</ref><ref>Лаппо Иван Иванович Происхождение украинской идеологии Новейшего времени. — Опубликовано в журнале Вестник Юго-Западной Руси, 2007. № 5.. — Ужгород, 1926.</ref> Line 37: The Little Russian identity remained dominant among elites even in the revolutionary years of 1917-1921.<ref name="Барановская">Барановская Н.М. Актуалізація ідей автономізму та федералізму в умовах національної революції 1917–1921 рр. як шлях відстоювання державницького розвитку України</ref> However, with the beginning of the [[Bolshevik]] policy of [[Ukrainization]], which was the local form of the [[Korenizatsiya]] policy, the Little Russian identity was declared 'antiquated and illegitimate'.<ref name="KMM"/> In the 1920s Bolshevik internationalists used the [[Ukrainian SSR]] and the [[Byelorussian SSR]] as "exhibition pavillons" of their nationality policy, hoping to gain sympathies of the disadvantaged East Slavic population in interwar [[Poland]].<ref name="2ident"/> At the same time they hoped to ultimately weaken pan-Russian imperialism in a society that was represented by their adversary in the [[Russian civil war]]: the Imperial Russian [[White Movement]]. The Bolsheviks had the largest credit in the realization and consolidation of the Ukrainian identity project.<ref name="Дмитриев"/> In the [[First All-Union Census of the Soviet Union]] (1926) the registration of people as Little Russians was restricted, and people in the Ukrainian SSR had to choose between the Ukrainian and Russian nationality or even were automatically registered as Ukrainians.<ref>Закатнова А. [http://www.rg.ru/2012/06/03/mnenie-site.html Украинцы победили малороссов в трехвековом идейном бою] // Российская газета : газета. — 2012, 3 июня.</ref>{{dubious|Was not nationality based on language?|date=December 2013}} The term 'Little Russian' remained in usage only among some White emigres.<ref name="KMM"/> Although the antiquated ''Little Russian'' identity gave way to the new ethnonym ''Ukrainian'', and the conception of a [[ === Present times === | |||