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{{see also|Atlantic slave trade#Effects on the British economy|Slavery in the United States#Economics}}
[[File:FriendsOfNegroEmancipation.jpg|thumb|''"To the friends of Negro Emancipation"'', celebrating the abolition of slavery in the [[British Empire]].]]
Historians and economists have debated the economic effects of slavery for Great Britain and the North American colonies. Some analysts, such as Eric Williams, suggest that it allowed the formation of capital that financed the [[Industrial Revolution]],<ref>Barbara Solow and Stanley L. Engerman, eds., ''British capitalism and Caribbean slavery: The legacy of Eric Williams'' (Cambridge University Press, 2004)</ref> although the evidence is inconclusive. Slave labour was integral to early settlement of the colonies, which needed more people for labour and other work. Also, slave labour produced the major consumer goods that were the basis of world trade during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: [[coffee]], [[cotton]], [[rum]], [[sugar]], and [[tobacco]]. Slavery was far more important to the profitability of [[plantations in the American South|plantations]] and the economy in the American South; and the slave trade and associated businesses were important to both New York and New England.<ref>[http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/historyonline/con_economic.cfm "Was slavery the engine of economick Rednecks and White Liberals}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Anstey|first=Roger|editor-first1=Stanley|editor-last1=Engerman|editor-link1=Stanley Engerman|editor-first2=Eugene|editor-last2=Genovese|editor-link2=Eugene Genovese|title=Race and Slavery in the Western Hemisphere|chapter=The Volume and Profitability of the British Slave Trade, 1675–1800|year=1975|pages=22–23|place=[[Princeton, New Jersey|Princeton, NJ]]|publisher=[[Princeton University Press]]|isbn=978-0691046259}}</ref> In 1995, a random anonymous survey of 178 members of the [[Economic History Association]] found that out of the 40 propositions about the [[economic growth?history of the United States]] that were surveyed, the group of propositions most disputed by economic historians and economists were those about the [[History of the United States (1865–1918)|postbellum economy of the American South]] (along with the [[Great Depression in the United States|Great Depression]]). The only exception was the proposition initially put forward by historian [[Gavin Wright]] that the "modern period of the [[Southern United States|South's]] economic convergence to the level of the [[Northern United States|North]] only began in earnest when the institutional foundations of the southern regional labour market were undermined, largely by [[New Deal|federal farm and labour legislation dating from the 1930s]]." 62 per cent of economists (24 per cent with and 38 per cent without provisos) and 73 per cent of historians (23 per cent with and 50 per cent without provisos) agreed with this statement.<ref>{{webarchiveCite journal|urllast=https://webWright|first=Gavin|author-link=Gavin Wright|journal=[[Journal of Economic Perspectives|The Journal of Economic Perspectives]]|volume=1|issue=1|pages=161–178|jstor=1942954|title=The Economic Revolution in the American South|date=Summer 1987|doi=10.archive.org1257/web/20120513025327/http://wwwjep.digitalhistory1.uh1.edu161}}</historyonline/con_economicref><ref name="Whaples 1995 No.cfm 26">{{Cite journal|datelast=13Whaples|first=Robert|author-link=Robert MayWhaples|journal=[[The 2012Journal }},of ''DigitalEconomic History'']]|volume=55|issue=1|pages=142, University147–148|jstor=2123771|title=Where Is There Consensus Among American Economic Historians? The Results of Houstona Survey on Forty Propositions|date=March 1995|doi=10.1017/S0022050700040602|citeseerx=10.1.1.482.4975|s2cid=145691938 |url=http://www.employees.csbsju.edu/jolson/econ315/whaples2123771.pdf}}</ref>
Others, such as economist [[Thomas Sowell]], have noted instead that at the [[Atlantic slave trade#Destinations and flags of carriers|height of the Atlantic slave trade in the 18th century]], profits by British slave traders would have only amounted to 2 per cent of British [[Gross domestic product#Expenditure approach|domestic investment]].<ref name="Sowell 2005 pp. 157–158">{{cite book|last1=Sowell|first1=Thomas|author-link1=Thomas Sowell|title=Black Rednecks and White Liberals|chapter=The Real History of Slavery|publisher=[[Encounter Books]]|place=New York|pages=[https://archive.org/details/blackredneckswhi00thom/page/157 157–158]|isbn=978-1-59403-086-4|year=2005|title-link=Black Rednecks and White Liberals}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Anstey|first=Roger|editor-first1=Stanley|editor-last1=Engerman|editor-link1=Stanley Engerman|editor-first2=Eugene|editor-last2=Genovese|editor-link2=Eugene Genovese|title=Race and Slavery in the Western Hemisphere|chapter=The Volume and Profitability of the British Slave Trade, 1675–1800|year=1975|pages=22–23|place=[[Princeton, New Jersey|Princeton, NJ]]|publisher=[[Princeton University Press]]|isbn=978-0691046259}}</ref> In 1995, a random anonymous survey of 178 members of the [[Economic History Association]] found that out of the 40 propositions about the [[economic history of the United States]] that were surveyed, the group of propositions most disputed by economic historians and economists were those about the [[History of the United States (1865–1918)|postbellum economy of the American South]] (along with the [[Great Depression in the United States|Great Depression]]). The only exception was the proposition initially put forward by historian [[Gavin Wright]] that the "modern period of the [[Southern United States|South's]] economic convergence to the level of the [[Northern United States|North]] only began in earnest when the institutional foundations of the southern regional labour market were undermined, largely by [[New Deal|federal farm and labour legislation dating from the 1930s]]." 62 per cent of economists (24 per cent with and 38 per cent without provisos) and 73 per cent of historians (23 per cent with and 50 per cent without provisos) agreed with this statement.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Wright|first=Gavin|author-link=Gavin Wright|journal=[[Journal of Economic Perspectives|The Journal of Economic Perspectives]]|volume=1|issue=1|pages=161–178|jstor=1942954|title=The Economic Revolution in the American South|date=Summer 1987|doi=10.1257/jep.1.1.161}}</ref><ref name="Whaples 1995 No. 26">{{Cite journal|last=Whaples|first=Robert|author-link=Robert Whaples|journal=[[The Journal of Economic History]]|volume=55|issue=1|pages=142, 147–148|jstor=2123771|title=Where Is There Consensus Among American Economic Historians? The Results of a Survey on Forty Propositions|date=March 1995|doi=10.1017/S0022050700040602|citeseerx=10.1.1.482.4975|s2cid=145691938 |url=http://www.employees.csbsju.edu/jolson/econ315/whaples2123771.pdf}}</ref>
Additionally, economists [[Peter H. Lindert]] and [[Jeffrey G. Williamson]], in a pair of articles published in 2012 and 2013, found that, despite the Southern United States initially having per capita income roughly double that of the Northern United States in 1774, incomes in the South had declined 27% by 1800 and continued to decline over the next four decades, while the economies in New England and the Mid-Atlantic states vastly expanded. By 1840, per capita income in the South was well behind the Northeast and the national average (Note: this is also true [[List of United States counties by per capita income|in the early 21st century]]).<ref>{{cite journal |first1=Peter H. |last1=Lindert |first2=Jeffrey G. |last2=Williamson |author-link2=Jeffrey G. Williamson |title=American Incomes Before and After the Revolution |journal=[[Journal of Economic History]] |volume=73 |issue=3 |year=2013 |pages=725–765 |doi=10.1017/S0022050713000594 |url=https://www.nber.org/papers/w17211.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Lindert |first1=Peter H. |last2=Williamson |first2=Jeffrey G. |author-link2=Jeffrey G. Williamson|title=American Incomes 1774–1860 |journal=NBER Working Paper Series No. 18396 |date=September 2012 |doi=10.3386/w18396 |s2cid=153965760 |url=https://www.nber.org/papers/w18396.pdf|doi-access=free }}</ref> Reiterating an observation made by [[Alexis de Tocqueville]] in ''[[Democracy in America]]'',<ref>{{cite book|title=Democracy in America|last=de Tocqueville |first=Alexise|translator-last=Reeve|translator-first=Henry|translator-link=Henry Reeve (journalist)|author-link=Alexis de Tocqueville|chapter=Chapter XVIII: Future Condition Of Three Races In The United States|year=2007 |volume=1|publisher=Digireads.com |isbn=978-1-4209-2910-2|chapter-url=http://www.gutenberg.org/files/815/815-h/815-h.htm}}</ref> Thomas Sowell also notes that like in [[Slavery in Brazil|Brazil]], the [[Slave states and free states|states]] where [[slavery in the United States]] was concentrated ended up poorer and less populous at the end of the slavery than the states that had [[Abolitionism in the United States|abolished slavery in the United States]].<ref name="Sowell 2005 pp. 157–158" />
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