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Because such are the empirical facts, the "rationalistic" theories and methods of Piaget and Kohlberg are rejected. Blasi argues that Haidt does not provide adequate evidence to support his position.{{Sfn|Narvaez|Lapsley|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=a2p_Tg8c0N8C&pg=PA412 412]}}
Haidt's model has seen extensive usage in sociology,<ref>{{Cite journal |lastlast1=Hitlin |firstfirst1=Steven |last2=Vaisey |first2=Stephen |date=2013-07-30 |title=The New Sociology of Morality |url=https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-soc-071312-145628 |journal=Annual Review of Sociology |language=en |volume=39 |issue=1 |pages=51–68 |doi=10.1146/annurev-soc-071312-145628 |issn=0360-0572}}</ref> however here it has faced criticism for neglecting the role of social perception in moral judgment.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Luft |first=Aliza |date=2020 |title=Theorizing Moral Cognition: Culture in Action, Situations, and Relationships |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2378023120916125 |journal=Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World |language=en |volume=6 |pages=237802312091612 |doi=10.1177/2378023120916125 |issn=2378-0231}}</ref> Aliza Luft argues that our moral judgments are not just informed by the action or behavior itself, but also how we socially categorize the individuals involved in the action. She points out that Haidt's early experiments relied on actors who were implicitly or explicitly characterized by race, gender, or other social categories. If these actors were imagined differently—for example, by changing the names of the incestuous couple in his experiment from "Mark" and "Julie" to "Jamal" and "Lakeisha"—different judgments might have emerged. This does not discount Haidt's model but encourages a focus on how judgments of action may intersect with judgments of people.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Abend |first=Gabriel |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=344pAgAAQBAJ&newbks=0&hl=en |title=The Moral Background: An Inquiry into the History of Business Ethics |date=2014-03-23 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-1-4008-5034-1 |language=en}}</ref>
Other researchers have criticized the evidence cited in support of social intuitionism relating to moral dumbfounding,<ref name="Haidt2000" /> arguing these findings rely on a misinterpretation of participants' responses.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Guglielmo |first1=Steve |title=Unfounded dumbfounding: How harm and purity undermine evidence for moral dumbfounding |journal=Cognition |date=January 2018 |volume=170 |pages=334–337 |doi=10.1016/j.cognition.2017.08.002|pmid=28803616 |s2cid=46809661 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Royzman|first1=Edward B|last2=Kim|first2=Kwanwoo|last3=Leeman|first3=Robert F|year=2015|title=The curious tale of Julie and Mark: Unraveling the moral dumbfounding effect|journal=Judgment and Decision Making|language=en|volume=10|issue=4|pages=296–313|doi=10.1017/S193029750000512X |s2cid=55658416 |doi-access=free}}</ref>
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