Social intuitionism: Difference between revisions - Wikipedia

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# The reasoning process has repeatedly been shown to create convincing post hoc justifications for behavior that are believed by people despite not actually correctly describing the reason underlying the choice. This was demonstrated in a classic paper by Nisbett and Wilson (1977).

# According to Haidt, moral action covaries more with moral emotion than with moral reasoning.

These four arguments led Haidt to propose a major reinterpretation of decades of existing work on moral reasoning:

{{Quote|Because the justifications that people give are closely related to the moral judgments that they make, prior researchers have assumed that the justificatory reasons caused the judgments. But if people lack access to their automatic judgment processes then the reverse causal path becomes more plausible. If this reverse path is common, then the enormous literature on moral reasoning can be reinterpreted as a kind of ethnography of the a priori moral theories held by various communities and age groups.<ref name="Haidt2001"/>{{rp|pages=822}}}}

==Objections to Haidt's model==