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Line 1: In [[moral psychology]], '''social intuitionism''' is a model that proposes that moral positions are often non-verbal and behavioral.<ref name="Haidt2001">{{cite journal |last1=Haidt |first1=Jonathan |title=The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. |journal=Psychological Review |date=2001 |volume=108 |issue=4 |pages=814–834 |doi=10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814|pmid=11699120 }}</ref> Often such social intuitionism is based on "moral dumbfounding" where people have strong moral reactions but fail to establish any kind of rational principle to explain their reaction.<ref name="Haidt2000">{{cite journal |last1=Haidt |first1=Jonathan |last2=Björklund |first2=Fredrik |last3=Murphy |first3=Scott |title=Moral Dumbfounding: When Intuition Finds No Reason |date=August 10, 2000 |url=http://theskepticalzone.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/haidt.bjorklund.working-paper.when-intuition-finds-no-reason.pub603.pdf}}</ref> The four principal forms of social intuitionism are described as (1) primarily [[Intuition|intuitive]] ("intuitions come first"), (2) rationalized, justified, or otherwise explained after the fact, (3) taken mainly to influence other people, and are (4) often influenced and sometimes changed by discussing such positions with others.<ref>{{Cite book|title = The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion|last = Haidt|first = Jonathan|publisher = Pantheon|year = 2012|isbn = 978-0307377906|pages = [https://archive.org/details/righteousmindwhy0000haid/page/913 913 Kindle ed]|url = https://archive.org/details/righteousmindwhy0000haid/page/913}}</ref> This model diverges from earlier [[rationalist]] theories of morality, such as of [[Lawrence Kohlberg]]'s [[Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development|stage theory of moral reasoning]].<ref>{{Cite journal|title = The Current Formulation of Kohlberg's Theory and a Response to Critics|journal = Human Development|pages = 94–100|volume = 28|issue = 2|doi = 10.1159/000272945|first = Charles|last = Levine|first2 = Lawrence|last2 = Kohlberg|first3 = Alexandra|last3 = Hewer|year = 1985}}</ref> Inspired in part by [[Antonio Damasio|Antonio Damasio's]] [[somatic marker hypothesis]], [[Jonathan Haidt|Jonathan Haidt's]] (2001) Social Intuitionist Model<ref name="Haidt2001" His main evidence comes from studies of "moral dumbfounding"<ref>{{Cite journal|last=McHugh|first=Cillian|last2=McGann|first2=Marek|last3=Igou|first3=Eric R.|last4=Kinsella|first4=Elaine L.|date=2017-10-04|title=Searching for Moral Dumbfounding: Identifying Measurable Indicators of Moral Dumbfounding|journal=Collabra: Psychology|language=en|volume=3|issue=1|pages=|doi=10.1525/collabra.79|issn=2474-7394|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=McHugh|first=Cillian|last2=McGann|first2=Marek|last3=Igou|first3=Eric R.|last4=Kinsella|first4=Elaine L.|date=2020-01-05|title=Reasons or rationalizations: The role of principles in the moral dumbfounding paradigm|journal=Journal of Behavioral Decision Making|language=en|volume=x|issue=x|pages=|doi=10.1002/bdm.2167|issn=1099-0771}}</ref> where people have strong moral reactions but fail to establish any kind of rational principle to explain their reaction.<ref>Haidt, Jonathan. The righteous mind. Pantheon: 2012. Loc 539, Kindle ed. In footnote 29, Haidt credits the neology of the term ''moral dumbfounding'' to social/experimental psychologist [[Daniel Wegner]]. </ref> An example situation in which moral intuitions are activated is as follows: Imagine that a brother and sister sleep together once. No one else knows, no harm befalls either one, and both feel it brought them closer as siblings. Most people imagining this [[incest]] scenario have very strong negative reaction, yet cannot explain why.<ref>Haidt, Jonathan. The righteous mind. Pantheon: 2012. Loc 763 Kindle ed.</ref> Referring to earlier studies by [[Howard Margolis]]<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition: A Theory of Judgment by Howard Margolis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, 332 pp. (ISBN 0-226-50527-8)|journal = The Educational Forum|date = 1989-06-30|issn = 0013-1725|pages = 199–202|volume = 53|issue = 2|doi = 10.1080/00131728909335595|first = Burton L.|last = Grover}}</ref> and others, Haidt suggests that we have [[Unconscious cognition|unconscious]] intuitive [[heuristics]] which generate our reactions to morally charged-situations, and underlie our moral behavior. He suggests that when people explain their moral positions, they often miss, if not hide, the core premises and processes that actually led to those conclusions.<ref>Haidt, Jonathan. The righteous mind. Pantheon: 2012. Loc 1160 Kindle ed.</ref> Line 33: Because such are the empirical facts, the "rationalistic" theories and methods of Piaget and Kohlberg are rejected. Blasi argues that Haidt does not provide adequate evidence to support his position.{{Sfn|Narvaez|Lapsley|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=a2p_Tg8c0N8C&pg=PA412 412]}} Other researchers have criticized the evidence cited in support of social intuitionism relating to moral dumbfounding,<ref name="Haidt2000" /> arguing these findings rely on a misinterpretation of participants' responses.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Guglielmo |first1=Steve |title=Unfounded dumbfounding: How harm and purity undermine evidence for moral dumbfounding |journal=Cognition |date=January 2018 |volume=170 |pages=334–337 |doi=10.1016/j.cognition.2017.08.002|pmid=28803616 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Royzman|first1=Edward B|last2=Kim|first2=Kwanwoo|last3=Leeman|first3=Robert F|year=2015|title=The curious tale of Julie and Mark: Unraveling the moral dumbfounding effect|url=https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2015-54495-002|journal=Judgment and Decision Making|language=en|volume=10|issue=4|page=296–313|via=}}</ref> ==See also== | |||