Social intuitionism: Difference between revisions - Wikipedia

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==Objections to Haidt's model==

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Among the main criticisms of Haidt's model are that it underemphasizes the role of reasoning.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=LaFollette |first1=Hugh |last2=Woodruff |first2=Michael L. |title=The limits of Haidt: How his explanation of political animosity fails |journal=Philosophical Psychology |date=13 September 2013 |volume=28 |issue=3 |pages=452–465 |doi=10.1080/09515089.2013.838752}}</ref> For example, Joseph Paxton and [[Joshua_Greene_(psychologist)|Joshua Greene]] (2010) review evidence suggesting that moral reasoning plays a significant role in moral judgment, including counteracting automatic tendencies toward bias.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Paxton |first1=Joseph M. |last2=Greene |first2=Joshua D. |title=Moral Reasoning: Hints and Allegations |journal=Topics in Cognitive Science |date=13 May 2010 |volume=2 |issue=3 |pages=511–527 |doi=10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01096.x|pmid=25163874 }}</ref> Greene and colleagues have proposed an alternative to the social intuitionist model -– the [[Dual process theory (moral psychology)|Dual Process Model]]<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Greene |first1=J. D. |title=An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment |journal=Science |date=14 September 2001 |volume=293 |issue=5537 |pages=2105–2108 |doi=10.1126/science.1062872|pmid=11557895 }}</ref> -– which suggests that [[deontological]] moral judgments, which involve rights and duties, are driven primarily by intuition, while [[utilitarian]] judgments aimed at promoting the greater good are underlain by controlled cognitive reasoning processes.

Augusto Blasi emphasizes the importance of moral responsibility and reflection as one analyzes an intuition.<ref>{{cite book |title=Personality, Identity, and Character: Explorations in Moral Psychology |last1=Narvaez |first1=Darcia |last2=Lapsley |first2=Daniel K. |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2009 |isbn=978-0-521-89507-1 |page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=a2p_Tg8c0N8C&pg=PA423 423]|ref=harv}}</ref> His main argument is that some, if not most, intuitions tend to be self-centered and self-seeking.{{Sfn|Narvaez|Lapsley|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=a2p_Tg8c0N8C&pg=PA397 397]}} Blasi critiques Haidt in describing the average person and questioning if this model (having an intuition, acting on it, and then justifying it) always happens. He came to the conclusion that not everyone follows this model. In more detail, Blasi proposes Haidt's five default positions on intuition.{{Clarify|reason=What is "propose" supposed to mean here?|date=February 2018}}

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==External links==

* [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11699120 Haidt, J. (2001). "The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment." ''Psychological Review. 108'', 814-834814–834.]

* [http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/Paxton_Greene-Moral_Reasoning-topiCS-10.pdf Paxton, J., & Greene, J. (2010). "Moral reasoning: Hints and allegations." ''Topics in Cognitive Science, 2'', 511-527511–527.]

[[Category:Moral psychology]]