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Line 1: [[ '''[[w:Sergey Biryuzov|Sergey Semyonovich Biryuzov]]''' ([[August 21]], [[1904]] – [[October 19]], [[1964]]) was a [[w:Marshal of the Soviet Union|Marshal of the Soviet Union]] and [[w:Chief of the General Staff (Russia)|Chief of the General Staff]]. On March 11, 1955, Biryuzov was given the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Between April 1955 and April 1962, Biriuzov was the Commander in Chief of the National Air Defense Force. After this, he was made Commander in Chief of the Strategic Missile Force, and in 1963, he was made the Chief of the General Staff. On October 19, 1964, Biriuzov was killed in a plane crash on the mount Avala near Belgrade. The urn containing his ashes is buried in the Kremlin. ==
* The [[Nazi Germany|Germans]] also attempted to muddle the issue. They composed fables and wrote on their lists that the Soviet generals had voluntarily deserted to the enemy side. None of us believed this. We knew well that such distinguished generals as Khomenko and Bobkov would not surrender alive to the enemy.▼ ▲== Sourced == ▲* The Germans also attempted to muddle the issue. They composed fables and wrote on their lists that the Soviet generals had voluntarily deserted to the enemy side. None of us believed this. We knew well that such distinguished generals as Khomenko and Bobkov would not surrender alive to the enemy. ** Quoted in "Fallen Soviet Generals: Soviet General Officers Killed in Battle" - Page 198 - by Aleksander A. Maslov, David M. Glantz - 1998 * We ceased to deal seriously with mobile combat. We relegated to oblivion the fundamentals of combat-in-depth tactics and of combined arms maneuvers which had been widespread before the [[Finland|Finnish]] campaign. ** Quoted in "Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939" - Page 997 - by Alvin D. Coox - Political Science - 1990 Line 14 ⟶ 12: ** Quoted in "Military Deception and Strategic Surprise" - by John Gooch, Amos Perlmutter - 1982 * The storming of the Mannerheim Line was regarded as a model of operational and tactical art. Troops were taught to overcome the enemy's protracted defense by a gradual accumulation of forces and a patient "gnawing through" of breaches in the enemy's fortifications in accordance with all the rules of engineering science. Insufficient attention was paid to questions of co-operation among different branches and services of the armed forces under rapidly changing conditions. We had to retrain ourselves under enemy fire, paying a high price for the experience and knowledge without which we could not beat [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]]'s army.▼
▲* The storming of the Mannerheim Line was regarded as a model of operational and tactical art. Troops were taught to overcome the enemy's protracted defense by a gradual accumulation of forces and a patient "gnawing through" of breaches in the enemy's fortifications in accordance with all the rules of engineering science. Insufficient attention was paid to questions of co-operation among different branches and services of the armed forces under rapidly changing conditions. We had to retrain ourselves under enemy fire, paying a high price for the experience and knowledge without which we could not beat Hitler's army. ** Quoted in "The Winter War: The Soviet Attack on Finland" - Page 146 - by Eloise Engle, Eloise Paananen, Lauri Paananen - History - 1992 Line 25 ⟶ 21: {{wikipedia}} {{DEFAULTSORT: [[Category: [[Category:Military leaders from the Soviet Union]] [[Category: [[Category: [[Category:Heroes of the Soviet Union]] [[Category:Chiefs of the Russian and Soviet General Stafff]] [[Category:Accidental deaths]] |