1973 oil crisis: Difference between revisions - Wikipedia

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In a later interview, Yamani accused Kissinger of not taking his warning seriously, saying all he did was to ask him not to speak anymore of this threat.{{sfn|Lacey|1981|p=399}} Angry at Kissinger, Yamani in an interview with the ''Washington Post'' on April 19, 1973, warned that King Faisal was considering an oil embargo.{{sfn|Lacey|1981|p=399}} At the time, the general feeling in Washington was the Saudis were bluffing and nothing would come of their threat to impose an oil embargo.{{sfn|Lacey|1981|pp=400–401}} The fact that Faisal's ineffectual half brother King Saud had imposed a cripplingly oil embargo on Britain and France during the Suez War of 1956 was not considered an important precedent. The CEOs of four of America's oil companies had after speaking to Faisal arrived in Washington in May 1973 with the warning that Faisal was considerably tougher, more intelligent and more ruthless than his half-brother Saud whom he had deposed in 1964, and his threats were serious.{{sfn|Lacey|1981|pp=401–402}} Kissinger declined to meet the four CEOs.{{sfn|Lacey|1981|p=402}}

In an assessment done by Kissinger and his staff about the Middle East in the summer of 1973, the repeated statements by Sadat about waging &nbsp;''jihad'' against Israel were dismissed as empty talk while the warnings from King Faisal were likewise regarded as inconsequential.{{sfn|Lacey|1981|p=402}} In September 1973, Nixon fired Rogers as Secretary of State and replaced him with Kissinger. Kissinger was later to state he had not been given enough time to know the Middle East as he settled into the State Department's office at Foggy Bottom as Egypt and Syria attacked Israel on October 6, 1973.{{sfn|Lacey|1981|p=4021}}<!--Page number is probably a typo-->

===The "oil weapon"===